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CHARACTER FLAWS
FREDERIC BLOOM
Character evidence doctrine is infected by error. It is riddled
with a set of pervasive mistakes and misconceptions—a
group of gaffes and glitches involving Rule 404(b)’s “other
purposes” (like intent, absence of accident, and plan) that
might be called “character flaws.” This Essay identifies and
investigates those flaws through the lens of a single,
sensational case: United States v. Henthorn. By itself,
Henthorn is a tale worth telling—an astonishing story of
danger and deceit, malice and murder. But Henthorn is
more than just a stunning story. It is also an example and an
opportunity, a chance to consider character flaws in evidence
law more broadly and an occasion to remedy them too. This
Essay makes use of that occasion. It critically examines
Henthorn: the arguments offered, the tactics deployed, the
opinions written, the evidence used. And it frames Henthorn
as a window into contemporary character flaws more
broadly, hoping to prompt an overdue conversation, both in
the courtroom and in the classroom, about the flaws that
now infect character evidence.
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INTRODUCTION
They say that character endures.1 So much else may come
and go—status and beauty, luck and money, fitness and fame.
But character, they say, holds constant, revealing our core
nature and laying bare our true selves: the quarreler inclined
to quarrel, the liar inclined to lie, the helper inclined to help.
And yet, in most settings, courts exclude evidence of
character. Evidence that a person has a particular character
trait or propensity—good or bad, noble or shameful, significant
or trivial—is deemed inadmissible to show that she “acted in
accordance therewith.”2 That was the rule at common law.3 It
remains the rule today.4

1. Many attribute this maxim to Horace Greeley, see, e.g., Anthony
Kronman, The Erotic Politician, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 363, 364 (1998) (“Horace
Greeley said the only thing that endures is character.”), but the aphorism’s
provenance is a tad dubious. The supposed passage—”Fame is a vapor, popularity
an accident, riches take wing, only one thing endures and that is character”—
proves quite difficult to locate in Greeley’s writings. In fact, the closest fit seems
to say nothing about character at all. See HORACE GREELEY, RECOLLECTIONS OF A
BUSY LIFE 143 (J.B. Ford & Co., 1868) (“Fame is a vapor; popularity an accident;
riches take wings; the only earthly certainty is oblivion . . . .”).
2. FED. R. EVID. 404.
3. See, e.g., People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930).
4. See FED. R. EVID. 404.
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There may be good reason why. We may exclude character
evidence because we think it unduly persuasive. It may tempt
a fact-finder into giving a person’s character too much clout
and too much credence5—and thus credit that person’s peaceful
(or violent or deceptive or honest) character more than it
should. Or we may exclude character evidence because we
think it distracting and disorienting. It may lure a fact-finder
in the wrong direction and focus it on the wrong thing—a
character trait instead of the crime charged, a propensity
instead of the facts proven, a separate act instead of the
conduct alleged.6 And so, very often, we ban it.
But still character evidence comes in. It comes in,
sometimes, because we affirmatively allow it—either in the
context of particular traits (like a witness’s character for
untruthfulness) or in cases of particular offenses (like sexual
assault).7 And it comes in, other times, because it sneaks in
where it shouldn’t. There may be reason for this too. Character
evidence may sneak in because “character” itself can be hard to
define and detect.8 Or it may sneak in because the allure of
character inferences can prove difficult to resist.9 Or it may
sneak in because the doctrine devised around our character
rules—a doctrine as well-intentioned as it is slippery and
recondite—can dupe even the most diligent of courts.10 But
plausible reasons should not mask a disquieting result: with
character evidence, what should stay out occasionally creeps in.
This Essay examines one stunning instance in which
impermissible character evidence crept in. It recounts the
timely and tragic tale of United States v. Henthorn, an
outrageous but all-too-real story of flat tires, flying beams, and
fatal falls.11 Harold Henthorn now sits in prison for a murder it

5. This is what Justice Cardozo famously called “excessive weight.”
Zackowitz, 172 N.E. at 468.
6. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 153 (3d ed., 2013).
7. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a), 413, 414, 415.
8. See, e.g., Barrett J. Anderson, Recognizing Character: A New Perspective
on Character Evidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1912, 1914 (2012) (“Unfortunately, the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not define character, and worse still, there is no
judicially manageable definition.”) (citations omitted).
9. See, e.g., Zackowitz, 172 N.E. at 466 (relying subtly on the power of
character evidence in discussing the defendant).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 28 F.3d 1574 (11th Cir. 1994), vacated,
516 U.S. 1022 (1995).
11. 864 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2017).
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seems clear he committed.12 But it seems just as clear that
some of the evidence mustered against him—truly damaging
and sensational evidence—should have been excluded all the
same. This Essay critically revisits that remarkable case.
But this Essay does more than scrutinize Henthorn. It also
studies a set of pervasive errors—what I call here “character
flaws”—that inform and infect modern character evidence
doctrine more broadly. These flaws are subtle, inviting, hard to
spot and even harder to resist—and all the more worrisome for
being that way. But they are still flaws, no less so for being so
common and so logical, as Henthorn keenly shows. They should
be understood that way.
But if Henthorn teaches us about these character flaws, it
can also teach us more. This Essay asks what else it might
teach us from a specific perspective: the vantage of Evidence
instructors using Henthorn as topic, as template, and as case
file. For three years, I have used Henthorn as a case-file anchor
in a writing-focused “applied evidence” course. This Essay
offers a unique, early, and self-critical accounting of that
course—a course built largely on Henthorn’s foundation and
focused, inevitably, on its character flaws.
This Essay begins, in Part I, with the ugly and
uncomfortable story of Harold Henthorn. The facts here take us
far afield—to secluded mountain roads and ambitious off-trail
hikes—and reach back long before his crime of conviction. Part
I recounts these facts, quickly but carefully, setting the frame
for the legal examination that follows.
Part II turns more deliberately to that legal examination—
and, in particular, to the central legal question in Henthorn:
whether specific “other act” evidence was or was not
inadmissible character evidence. Here I start before trial and
work forward, chronicling and critiquing the various
arguments made, rejected, and accepted by parties and judges
alike, both at the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado and at the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. This retelling is intentionally targeted and
unflinching. It picks no favorites and finds no heroes. What it
finds instead is a real and repeated problem with the case’s
approach to character evidence, and what it offers is
opportunity to address that problem head on.

12.

Id.
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Part III considers how that problem might be addressed in
a particular setting: a classroom that concentrates on Henthorn
as both human tragedy and teaching tool. This Part briefly
recounts the genesis of an “applied evidence” class centered on
Henthorn, and it then considers questions as vital
pedagogically as they are substantively: How might these
“character flaws” be addressed in contemporary doctrine, even
if only in future cases? Are they inevitable? And how should we
engage a case, like Henthorn, that seems to reach the “right”
human result for the wrong legal reason?
A short conclusion then reminds why Henthorn might be so
revealing—and why it is so important that the case’s character
flaws do not themselves endure.
I.

THE FACTS

Late in the afternoon of September 29, 2012—a mild and
sunny early-autumn Saturday—Toni Henthorn fell from a
secluded cliff near the Aspenglen portion of Rocky Mountain
National Park.13 The drop was long, precipitous, and severe—
some 120 feet from scraggy clifftop to jagged ground below.
Only one person saw her: her husband Harold.14
Harold would later claim that Toni toppled accidentally,
having lost her balance while trying to take a photo.15
Prosecutors would allege that Harold pushed her.16
By all accounts Toni was gravely injured by the fall.17
Reports confirm that she suffered broken bones, lacerated
organs, and substantial blood loss—injuries so intense that
very few could survive them even with the best of aid. But
trained medical assistance could not reach Toni until almost
8:00 p.m., nearly three hours later. By then Toni was dead.18
Harold is now in prison for her murder.19

13. Id.
14. Like the courts in Henthorn, I use many first names here, not out of a
heavy-handed sense of familiarity, but rather for reasons of true compositional
necessity. So many of the people involved in this case have the same surname that
I must rely instead on first names—just as the courts did.
15. Order at 1, United States v. Henthorn, No. 14-cr-00448-RBJ (D. Colo. May
29, 2015).
16. Id.
17. See Henthorn, 864 F.3d at 1247 n.4.
18. Id.
19. Id.

1106

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

This Part tells the story of how he got there. Very little of
that story unfurls smoothly—not the prosecution, not the
defense, not the fact narrative itself. Nor is the story of Toni’s
passing confined to that dreadful autumn day. As the pages
ahead will show, the story actually reaches back before
September 29, back almost seventeen years, to another wife,
another isolated location, and another unusual death—but the
same Harold. Yet still, by twist and by turn, this story will
bring us to a question not of fact but of law—a question of
“other acts,” outrageous coincidence, and character evidence.
A.

The Cliff

Toni Bertolet met Harold Henthorn online in 1999.20 She
was a successful ophthalmologist.21 He claimed to be a
fundraiser. She lived and worked in Mississippi, close to her
family. He lived in Colorado.
After nine months of courtship, Toni and Harold wed. The
couple lived for a time in Mississippi but eventually settled in
Colorado, and Toni soon established an ophthalmology practice
there. In 2005, they had their only child, a daughter named
Haley.
By most accounts the Henthorns’ marriage was uneasy.
Babysitters described Harold’s behavior as off-putting, even
suspicious.22 Friends claimed that Toni and Harold slept in
separate bedrooms.23 And though Harold was a doting (if
domineering) father,24 he proved a fickle, controlling, and
secretive spouse: He took mysterious trips, ostensibly for
business, sometimes leaving the house without luggage and
long after scheduled flight times had passed.25 He complained
about Toni’s work, threatening her with divorce and refusing to
support her even after she had knee surgery.26 And he
accumulated life insurance policies on Toni—multiple policies
20. See Answer Brief of the United States at 1, United States v. Henthorn,
864 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-1490) [hereinafter Answer Brief].
21. Id. at 1–3 (noting that Toni also derived substantial income from a familyowned sulfur mine and generous gifts from her parents).
22. See Application for a Search Warrant at 25–26, Henthorn, 864 F.3d 1241
(No. 13-sw-05063-MEH).
23. Id. at 18–19.
24. Id. at 25–26.
25. Id. at 18.
26. Id. at 16.
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of significant value—without her knowledge and payable
entirely to him.27
And yet the marriage lasted. Through physical absences
and covert purchases, through verbal confrontations and silent
lies, Toni and Harold stayed together. The day of Toni’s
passing, September 29, 2012, would mark their twelfth
anniversary.28
Harold alleges that what happened that day was a terrible
mishap. The couple had traveled a couple hours north, he said,
for a romantic getaway, a weekend celebration of more than a
decade of wedlock.29 Harold claimed to have been planning the
details for weeks—a stay at the Stanley Hotel, a dinner at a
fancy restaurant, a quiet excursion in Rocky Mountain
National Park. What he hadn’t planned—to hear him tell it—
was just one thing: a sojourn off trail, away from crowds and
Park services and cellphone coverage, and onto a secluded
twelve-story precipice. That risky jaunt was impromptu,
impulsive, meant only to search out some privacy.30 And what
happened there came out of the blue. Only after Toni tried to
take a photo did she stumble, and only after it was too late did
Harold realize the risk.31 Harold meant no harm and connived
no murder. Toni’s death was, by Harold’s account, the worst of
accidents.
But by other accounts it was the foulest of crimes. Indeed,
the United States Attorney32 believed Toni’s death to be no
accident. They believed it to be the culmination of a long and
devilish plot—a scheme devised before Toni and Harold even
married and carried out, years later, in the coldest of blood.33
In the prosecution’s telling, Harold did not choose Toni for
companionship or marry her for love. He chose Toni for
opportunity and married her for money. The September 29
27. Answer Brief, supra note 20, at 2.
28. Id. at 5–6.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 8.
31. Id. at 20–21.
32. Crimes of this type are not often prosecuted in federal court. But Toni’s
alleged murder happened on federal land—a national park—and so there was
federal jurisdiction. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-1-103 (2017).
33. The prosecution’s theory of Harold’s guilt is alluringly simple: Harold
married Toni, not for companionship, but for (indirect) access to wealth. He
amassed significant life insurance policies in Toni’s name and then killed her so
he alone could collect. See, e.g., Answer Brief, supra note 20, at 2 (“Henthorn’s real
job was secretly accumulating life insurance on Toni . . . .”).
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outing—with its furtive, unsafe trek to the cliff—was his
deliberate and diabolical move to cash in.
A good deal of circumstantial evidence pointed that way.
For one, there was the insurance. On the day of her death, Toni
was covered by four separate life insurance policies, each worth
$1 million or more. At most Toni knew of one of these policies.34
Harold knew of and managed all four—and filed claims to
collect on the Monday just after Toni’s Saturday death.35
But there was more than insurance. There was also
Harold’s erratic behavior and shifting tales—both before and
after Toni’s tragic fall. Before that fall, Harold was a disturbing
acquaintance and a disagreeable spouse: volatile, vindictive,
coarse. He boasted that, before marrying Toni, he drew up
“financial profiles” of women he dated.36 He lied about his
professional pursuits, even to Toni. He controlled
conversations, hectored his family, and demanded deference.
And he apparently scouted the terrain in Rocky Mountain
National Park surreptitiously, including the backcountry areas
near the fateful rock face, though he later denied this fact.37
And Harold’s behavior after Toni’s fall was just as odd.
Even on September 29, and even in conversation with
emergency personnel, he appeared shifty, detached, and
indifferent, seeming only to feign distress—and only then in
fits and starts.38 He first dialed 911 some forty-five minutes
after Toni fell, claiming it took him that long to reach Toni, to
move her, and to find cell coverage.39 About fifteen minutes
into that call, however, he told the 911 operator that he needed
to hang up so he could save his cell-phone battery—but then
immediately began texting Toni’s brother.40 About an hour

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Alan Gathright et al., Sinister Clues to Harold Henthorn’s Alleged Plot to
Kill His Wife Revealed in New Documents, DENVER CHANNEL (Nov. 19, 2014),
https://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/local-news/sinister-clues-to-haroldhenthorns-alleged-plot-to-kill-his-wife-revealed-in-new-documents
[https://perma.cc/2XG8-QYA6].
37. See United States v. Henthorn, 864 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 2017) (“For
instance, Henthorn reported a white sheet adorned a cliff near Toni’s fall, but that
sheet had actually been removed by Park Service the week before her fall.”).
38. See Answer Brief supra note 20, at 12–16.
39. See id. at 12 (“Forty-five minutes later, Henthorn calls 911.”); see also id.
at 14 (“Given her injuries, Toni died between 20 minutes and an hour after her
fall . . . .”).
40. More specifically, these texts were sent to Toni’s brother Barry, a
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later, Harold called 911 again—likely after Toni had passed41—
and purported, awkwardly, to follow the operator’s CPR
instructions.42 Yet he quickly ended that call too, again (he
claimed) because of battery concerns—but then phoned and
texted a friend sixteen times in the subsequent hour.43
All the while, both in the park and after, Harold’s story
changed. First he said the couple scurried to the cliff to see
some wild turkeys; then he claimed they were in search of
romantic escape.44 First he said that Toni was dead for hours
by the time Park Rangers arrived; then he said her heart
stopped just as the Rangers appeared.45 First he said that Toni
lost her balance while he checked his phone for news of Haley’s
soccer game; then he said that he was looking at Toni’s own
phone for news of her patients, though investigators later
found that phone sitting in Toni’s Denver office, a hundredsome miles away.46 Each time Harold told his tale, it seemed,
the chapters jumped and jumbled—but still never quite fit.
And then there was the map. On the night of Toni’s death,
the Park Service conducted a search of Harold’s Jeep. There
they found something remarkable: a park map, dotted with
notes and arrows and circles, all made in Harold’s blocky
hand.47 Most of those notes were insignificant or inscrutable,
entirely unrelated to Toni’s death. But one note stood out: a
solitary X, drawn in red marker, at precisely the spot where
Toni perished. Harold later contended that he marked the map
for someone else, a man named Daniel Jarvis, and that the red
X was sheer coincidence.48 But Harold’s explanation never
settled, and through each of his shifting retellings there was
still the red X, a glaring strike against Harold’s story of
uncharted territory, unplanned diversions, and spontaneous
hikes.

cardiologist. See Application for Search Warrant at 10, Henthorn, 864 F.3d (No.
13-sw-05063-MEH).
41. Answer Brief, supra note 20, at 14.
42. Id. at 15 (“. . . the dispatcher doubted that Henthorn was actually
performing CPR.”); see also Henthorn, 864 F.3d at 1247 (“Toni’s lipstick was not
even smeared from the alleged mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.”).
43. Answer Brief, supra note 20, at 15.
44. Id. at 8.
45. Id. at 15.
46. Id. at 21–22.
47. Id. at 17.
48. Id.
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Other Acts

All of this evidence the prosecution had. Even more, all of
this evidence the prosecution seemed ready, willing, and able to
use. A stream of witnesses, unconvinced by Harold and eager to
recount his fitful behavior in the weeks surrounding Toni’s
death, stood ready too.
But the prosecution hoped for more. In particular, the
prosecution hoped to introduce two episodes from Harold’s
past.49 For September 29 was not the first “accident” that befell
Toni, apparently at Harold’s doing. And Toni was not the first
wife that Harold Henthorn had lost.50
1. The Beam
It is not clear if Harold earned much money during his
marriage to Toni. Though he convinced some acquaintances
that he was a successful businessman, “flying around” the
country for work,51 he seemed to contribute little, if anything,
to the family’s accounts. His job as a fundraiser was, by most
reports, a lie.
Toni’s job was not. She was a thriving ophthalmologist,
both in Colorado and before. She also derived a healthy bump
in income from her share in a lucrative family sulfur mine and
from gifts from her generous parents. All told, Toni made a
good deal of money—enough to be the real breadwinner52 in the
Henthorn family (despite Harold’s posturing) and enough to
afford a primary home near Denver and a mountain cabin near
the small Colorado town of Granby.
Photographs of that cabin show it to be tidy, charming, and
rustic. Surrounded by trees on three sides, the cabin sits on a
quiet hill, a gentle slope rolling off one corner. Attached to that
corner is an expansive timber deck.53
In May of 2011, while under that deck, Toni was struck in
the back of the neck with a twenty-foot wooden beam. Harold
49. Harold’s prosecutors also wished to introduce evidence of a third “other
act”: “[A] life insurance policy taken out in the name of Grace Rishell, Mr.
Henthorn’s sister-in-law.” The district court excluded this evidence. Order, supra
note 15, at 17–18.
50. See infra, Section I.B.2.
51. See Application for a Search Warrant, supra note 22, at 20.
52. See Answer Brief, supra note 20, at 2.
53. Id. at 34.
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admitted he threw it. Or at least he admitted as much to the
paramedics who arrived first, claiming that he did not see Toni
below him in the dark mountain night.54
But soon Harold’s account changed. He told the emergency
room doctor that the beam was not thrown off the deck but fell
on its own. He told a friend that he inadvertently dropped the
beam while standing on a ladder that Toni was trying to hold
steady. And he told still others that the beam fell on Toni,
without his knowledge, as she cleaned under the deck by
herself.55
Whatever the story, the prosecution in Henthorn wanted
the jury to hear it. It was, to them, rich and revealing
information—evidence of a victim repeatedly targeted and a
defendant “murderously inclined.”56 And perhaps it was.
But still there was more.
2. Lynn
Harold had been married before. Long before he met Toni,
he was wed to Sandra Lynn Henthorn—a social worker
everyone called Lynn.57
Lynn died in 1995, crushed beneath a Jeep on a snaky and
secluded mountain road near Sedalia.58 Only Harold was there
to see it, again the lone witness to his spouse’s fatal turn—but
here too he denied all blame. He claimed that Lynn was
smothered when the two jacks holding the car broke
unexpectedly, dropping the car’s full weight on his wife, who
had been scrambling underneath to retrieve some stray parts.59
In Harold’s telling, he was not a killer in search of victims but
a husband left twice bereft. Lynn’s death was just like Toni’s:
tragic, surreal, improbable—but accidental still.
For years, as we will see, the authorities agreed about
Lynn. But pieces of Harold’s story there still seemed odd from
the start. Harold claimed, for example, that the Jeep had a flat
54. Id. at 35 (“[A]fter ten at night . . .”).
55. Id. at 36.
56. People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930).
57. See Defendant Henthorn’s Motion in Limine Regarding Proposed Douglas
County 404(b) Evidence at 3, United States v. Henthorn, 864 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir.
2017) (No. 14-cr-00448-RBJ).
58. See Answer Brief, supra note 20, at 24.
59. Id. at 31. What these parts were was never entirely clear. At some times
Harold said they were lug nuts; at others he said it was a flashlight. Id.
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tire, punctured miles before by some loose nails. But by
Harold’s own later account, the tire was not flat but merely
“spongy,”60 and he planned to swap it for a tire with even less
air pressure still. Harold claimed, too, that he used boat jacks
to raise the vehicle instead of the Jeep’s own equipment
because the car’s jack was stuck tight, immobile even after
being lubricated.61 But by official accounts the car’s simple jack
seemed untested, and no lubricant was ever found.62
Stranger still, on that perilous night, Harold resisted
assistance. A mechanic stopped to offer help only minutes
before the Jeep collapsed, worried that the Henthorns were
marooned on a dark and treacherous byway, but Harold sent
him away curtly, saying they were only “wrapping up.”63 Then,
after the jacks broke and Lynn was injured, Harold flagged
down a family—the Montoyas—only to seem vexed by, not
thankful for, their attempts to help.64 Still the Montoyas did
help, and valiantly, searching for phone service, using their
own jack, waiting for and then cheering on emergency aid. But
Harold seemed ungrateful, even defiant, all the while, meeting
the Montoyas’ expressions of hope with a toxic combination of
derision and fear. And despite the Montoyas’ best efforts, Lynn
soon passed.65
In the brief investigation that followed, local sheriffs
documented a curious scene: two broken boat jacks, no
lubricant, underinflated tires, a suspicious footprint on the rear
bumper, and a bereaved spouse eager and quick to cash a
surprisingly large life insurance policy.66 As time passed,
Harold’s story of Lynn’s demise continued to tweak and twist
too—from lug nuts under the car to a flashlight, from two jacks
used at once to one at a time, from Lynn changing the tire to
Harold doing it himself, from a leisurely drive after dinner to a
directed drive before it.67 But still no charges were filed, at
least back then.68 The file on Lynn’s death was closed only six
days after it was opened. Lynn was soon cremated, her death
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 29.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 26. The good-Samaritan mechanic thought this reaction strange. Id.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30–31.
He may still be charged eventually. See infra Section III.B.
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deemed an accident.69
Yet prosecutors in Toni’s case still wanted the jury to hear
this tale. Like the beam in Granby, Lynn’s death near Sedalia
appeared probing, persuasive, and narratively helpful—no less
so for having happened so many years before. It was not, to
them, an isolated moment of heartbreaking misfortune but a
connected chapter of deliberate offense. It was, in their eyes,
more and powerful evidence of who Harold Henthorn was at
his core: a scheming husband, an insurance fraudster, an
inveterate liar, and a murderer on the loose.
C.

The Verdict

That is the image prosecutors sketched for the jury. They
drew a portrait of a man who had killed before, killed here, and
would readily kill again. Toni did not stumble off the cliff,
prosecutors argued—just as the beam did not fall from the deck
and the jacks did not break by accident. Toni was pushed, just
like the beam was thrown and Lynn was smothered on
purpose. Harold was the hand behind it all. He was the
murderer.
A federal jury heard all of this. It heard about the beam in
Granby and the Jeep near Sedalia; it heard about Harold’s
dastardly schemes, ill-gotten profits, and lethal “design[s].”70
And then, after very little deliberation,71 it found Harold
guilty.72 He has been in federal prison since.
That verdict was no surprise. Having heard what it heard
and learned what it learned, the jury was almost certain to find
against Harold. It would have been astounding had it voted the
other way.
But still the verdict was tainted. It was stained, not by
juror misconduct or procedural blunder, but by an evidentiary
error—a mistake neither easily excused nor quickly explained
away. That mistake blights the Tenth Circuit’s recent
69. Answer Brief, supra note 20, at 32.
70. See, e.g., id. at 41.
71. News reports suggest that the jury deliberated for “less than a day.” See
Anica Padilla & Phil Tenser, Harold Henthorn Found Guilty of Murder, DENVER
CHANNEL (Sept. 21, 2015, 8:27 AM), http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news
/local-news/jury-deliberating-whether-harold-henthorn-murdered-his-wife-bypushing-her-off-a-cliff [https://perma.cc/L2Y4-7J8K].
72. The verdict was announced on September 21, 2015, almost exactly three
years after Toni’s fatal fall. Id.
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Henthorn opinion too, appearing there in stark and crystallized
form—as I explain at length below. But this mistake took root
long before appeal, before Harold’s jury was even empaneled
and his trial had even begun. It took root in the prosecution’s
trial strategy, a convincing and compelling tactic built on a
crucial misapprehension of character evidence law. It took root
in a character flaw.
II. THE LAW & CHARACTER FLAWS
I should be clear: I do not mean to question Harold’s guilt
as a moral or factual matter. I do not mean to claim that
Harold is innocent of harming Toni or Lynn. Nor do I mean to
condemn the simple intuition behind the prosecution’s
approach. Harold’s tale is truly striking in its strangeness, his
luck (if that is indeed what it is) astonishing in its cruelty. The
stories of the Granby beam and the Sedalia Jeep are
sensational, even scandalous, all by themselves—no matter
how one reads them. And when set beside Toni’s tragedy, the
pieces seem uncanny in their coincidence: the improbable
events, the isolated locations, the insurance policies, the
unstable explanations, the lost wives. It is no wonder the
prosecution would want the jury to hear the tale fully told.
It is no wonder, either, that the prosecution would invite a
critical inference: Harold Henthorn is a dangerous and
despicable person, a man who is bad at his core and does bad
things. And since he harmed his spouses before, on purpose
and for a reason, he surely must have done so—and meant to
do so—here too. The argument seems airtight.
But there is a problem. There is a snag in that argument, a
glitch not of fact or of logic but of law:73 it is impermissible
under our rules.74 Our rules of evidence prohibit precisely the
argument offered by the prosecution and accepted by the
courts. Our rules forbid the very character attack that seemed
so intuitive in Henthorn and that worked there so well.
Harold’s prosecutors portrayed him as an evil actor, a vile
manipulator who “acted in accordance” with his wicked
character on at least three occasions.75 Logic may endorse this
73. Cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”).
74. See FED. R. EVID. 404.
75. Id.
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tactic. The law does not.
This Part examines that uncomfortable truth. It assesses
the split between what the Henthorn courts admitted and what
the law, by its terms, actually condones. As we will see, the
doctrine here can be dense and difficult, full of subtle
distinctions and tempting-but-impermissible turns. But
difficulty should offer no excuse. Harold Henthorn should, and
I believe could, have been convicted on evidence rightly
admissible under the law. Instead he was convicted in part on
evidence the prosecution never should have offered, the courts
never should have admitted, and the jury never should have
seen. He was convicted in part on impermissible character
evidence and sits in prison by way of character flaw.
A.
full:

Law

Begin with a rule. Federal Rule of Evidence 404 reads in
Rule 404. Character Evidence; Crimes or Other Acts
(a) Character Evidence.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person’s character
or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character or trait.
(2) Exceptions for a Defendant or Victim in a
Criminal Case. The following exceptions apply in a
criminal case:
(A) a defendant may offer evidence of the
defendant’s pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted,
the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it;
(B) subject to the limitations in Rule 412, a
defendant may offer evidence of an alleged victim’s
pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, the
prosecutor may:
(i) offer evidence to rebut it; and
(ii) offer evidence of the defendant’s same trait;
and
(C) in a homicide case, the prosecutor may offer
evidence of the alleged victim’s trait of peacefulness to rebut
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.
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(3) Exceptions for a Witness. Evidence of a witness’s
character may be admitted under Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or
other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted
in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This
evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as
proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
On request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor
must:
(A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature
of any such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at
trial; and
(B) do so before trial — or during trial if the court,
for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.76

This is our baseline. It sets the terms for character
evidence in federal litigation, and it announces its basic
prohibition more than once: In subpart (a) it states that
“Evidence of a person’s character . . . is not admissible to
prove . . . the person acted in accordance with [that]
character.”77 In subpart (b) it notes that “Evidence of a crime,
wrong, or other act” is inadmissible to “show that on a
particular occasion [a] person acted in accordance with [her]
character.”78 Rule 404’s character bar is so important,
apparently, that the drafters saw fit to state it twice.
They also defined “character” broadly. Under Rule 404,
“character” includes traits and proclivities, penchants and
“other act[s]”—all of them.79 But whatever form character
evidence may take, Rule 404’s general bar is emphatic: a party
may not argue that a person’s character (her peaceful nature,
say, or her past bank robberies) makes her more likely to have
done something in keeping with that character (avoiding
physical conflict, say, or robbing another bank). That kind of
propensity inference is prohibited. Under Rule 404, that kind of
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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character evidence is banned.80
There are exceptions. Rule 404(a) makes character
evidence admissible in a small set of contexts—like when a
criminal defendant offers evidence of his own “pertinent”
character trait, or when a party offers evidence bearing on a
witness’s character for truthfulness.81 Rules 413, 414, and 415,
in turn, make character evidence admissible if it is of a
particular type in a particular kind of litigation: specific acts of
sexual misconduct in cases about sexual misconduct.82 In those
instances, character evidence may be used to show propensity:
A criminal defendant can offer evidence of his peaceful
character to prove he was more likely to sidestep conflict; a
party can offer evidence of a witness’s character for
untruthfulness to prove that witness more likely to lie; a
prosecutor can offer evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual
wrongdoing in a case about sexual assault.83 But these
exceptions are targeted, limited, and construed narrowly. None
applied in Henthorn, and no one suggested they did.84
That is a point worth repeating: No exception to the ban on
character evidence applied in Henthorn. No rule permitted the
prosecution to argue that Harold was a bad person by character
and therefore more likely to do bad things. No provision
allowed the prosecution to claim that because Harold had done
evil things before—hurling a beam at Toni, scheming to
murder Lynn—he was more likely to have pushed Toni on
September 29. And yet this is precisely what the prosecution
did.
To be fair, the prosecution would say otherwise. It would
say the evidence of Harold’s “other acts”—the beam and the
Jeep—was admitted properly, not because it could claim an
exception, but because it did not need to claim one at all.
Evidence of the beam and the Jeep, the prosecution would say,
was not even character evidence. It was evidence of a different
cast, offered for a different reason, and admitted through a
different door.
It is an appealing argument, forcefully made. It intrigued
the courts and succeeded there. But it is still wrong as a matter
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 413–15.
Id.
See, e.g., Order, supra note 15.
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of law. In Henthorn the prosecution offered, and two courts
admitted, character evidence for prohibited propensity reasons.
That was an error, and a meaningful one—as the pages ahead
will show.
B.

Character Flaws

The error is not one of misread rules. It is true—and all
agree—that Rule 404 permits the introduction of “other acts”
(like the beam and the Jeep) for non-character reasons.85 A
prosecutor can introduce evidence of a defendant’s past
adventures in computer hacking, for example, not to show a
propensity to hack, but to show that the defendant possessed
the specialized knowledge necessary to commit that specialized
crime. A defendant can offer evidence of an alleged victim’s
extramarital cohabitation, in turn, not to show a penchant for
promiscuity, but to reveal a potential bias to lie.86 These are
not exceptions to the ban on character evidence. These are
routes around that ban—the use of the same evidence for other,
permissible reasons.
This is what the prosecution purported to do in Henthorn.
It claimed to offer Harold’s other acts to show, not propensity,
but other things: intent, motive, common plan, preparation,
absence of accident, doctrine of chances.87 But a close review of
the evidence, a conscientious study of the arguments, and an
assiduous attention to the law reveal something different. They
reveal that this was just character evidence in different
packaging, propensity evidence masked in an alluring but
impermissible guise. And it was that way from the start.
Harold’s lawyers knew from the beginning that the
prosecution wished to introduce his other acts. They knew the
narrative role those acts would play, the ominous connotations
those acts would carry, and the poisonous inference Harold’s
jury would inevitably draw. So they moved to exclude them
long before trial began.88
85. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
86. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988).
87. See, e.g., Government’s Response to Henthorn’s Motions in Limine to
Exclude 404(b) Evidence, United States v. Henthorn, No. 14-cr-00448-RBJ (D.
Colo. Apr. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Government’s Response].
88. See Defendant Henthorn’s Motion in Limine Regarding Proposed Douglas
County 404(b) Evidence, United States v. Henthorn, No. 14-cr-00448-RBJ (D.
Colo. Mar. 16, 2015); Defendant Henthorn’s Motion in Limine Regarding Proposed
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These motions to exclude are neither long nor subtle. They
assert, directly, that evidence of the beam and the Jeep is
inadmissible character evidence: “The proposed evidence . . . is
inadmissible,” Harold’s trial counsel writes, “and exactly the
type of evidence that Rule 404[] prohibits.”89 The prosecution’s
response says just the opposite—that this evidence is not
character evidence, that it is being offered for other reasons,
and that Rule 404 does not forbid its use.90
This, then, is the crucial question. Is evidence of the beam
and the Jeep propensity evidence, as Harold claims, and
therefore inadmissible? Or is it non-character evidence, as the
prosecution alleges, and therefore compatible with Rule 404?
That is the decisive issue the District Court confronted before
trial, and it is the only real issue the Tenth Circuit engaged on
appeal. It is also the issue I examine, at long last, here.
1. Threshold Matters
Two things should be mentioned at the outset. The first is
about combination and conflation in (non-)character argument,
the second about relevant precedent.
First, combination and conflation. Rule 404 is explicit:
evidence of a person’s other acts “may be admissible for
another [non-character] purpose”—like proving knowledge or
motive, preparation or plan.91 If a defendant wishes to
introduce a witness’s “other act” of cohabitation to establish
bias to lie, for example, he may—provided all other rules allow
it.92 If a prosecutor wants to introduce a defendant’s “other act”
of computer hacking to show specialized knowledge, in turn,
she may do that too. But contemporary doctrine does not
require courts to sniff out those other purposes unassisted,
rooting around like legal detectives left alone in the dark.
Contemporary doctrine instead places a burden on the
proponent of the evidence to “articulate” any permissible
Grand Lake Deck Incident, United States v. Henthorn, No. 14-cr-00448-RBJ (D.
Colo. Mar. 16, 2015); Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude 404(b) Evidence
Regarding Rishell Life Insurance Policy, United States v. Henthorn, No. 14-cr00448-RBJ (D. Colo. Mar. 16, 2015).
89. See Defendant Henthorn’s Motion in Limine Regarding Proposed Douglas
County 404(b) Evidence, supra note 88, at 10.
90. See Government’s Response, supra note 87, at 1.
91. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
92. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988).
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purpose with precision and specificity, and to do so from the
start.93 Cursory claims and vague hints are not sufficient.
Parties must identify what their permissible purposes are—
clearly, early, and “precisely.”94
Harold’s prosecutors “articulate[d]” many supposedly
permissible purposes. In their papers and oral representations,
in fact, they listed at least these: motive, intent, plan,
preparation, absence of accident, and doctrine of chances. That
is “articulation” to be sure, at length and with confidence. It
catalogs an array of other purposes, dutifully naming and
noting each—if also often mixing them together.95 There is no
lack of formulation here.
But a closer look spots a problem. The problem is not that
the prosecutors’ list has too many entries, for the law does not
require parties to pick only one or two other purposes—and no
party should be punished for having too many arguments
instead of too few. Nor is the problem that the prosecution fails
to find related precedent, a point addressed more fully below.
The problem is that these other purposes are independently
untenable and, in the prosecution’s presentation, almost never
stand alone. That first problem (of being untenable) is
addressed at length in the pages ahead, where I assess,
purpose by purpose, why none quite work. But the second
problem—the prosecution’s combination and conflation of these
other purposes—merits brief mention here too.
I should underscore that the prosecution’s “other purpose”
argument is confidently rendered and assertively made. It
engages on many fronts at once, leveling many claims and
assembling many sources. But too often the prosecution seems
to proceed on the theory that the whole of its non-character
arguments can be greater than the sum of its parts. It seems to
advance the idea that bits and pieces of not-quite-adequate
other purposes can combine, somehow, into a passable
nonpropensity explanation—that a batch of half steps and near
misses, through some curious Rule 404 alchemy, can mix
together into something that otherwise works.96 It is a subtle

93. United States v. Birch, 39 F.3d 1089, 1093 (10th Cir. 1994) (citations
omitted).
94. Id.
95. See Government’s Response, supra note 87, at 11.
96. See, e.g., Answer Brief, supra note 20, at 49 (“Each of these proper 404(b)
inferences—plan, motive, intent—draws on the doctrine of chances, not on
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and clever tactic, if also an occluding one—the kind that makes
a cloudy doctrine even harder to see through. But it is not what
the law demands. What the law demands is a tenable and
independent “other purpose,” a stand-alone non-character
reason for evidence to be admitted. It does not permit parties to
mix an almost-there argument about identity (say) with a notquite-right claim about absence of accident. It requires a
distinct and sufficient reason, an “other purpose” that works
properly and precisely all by itself. Yet a rigorous,
unadulterated search for such a purpose is almost entirely
absent in Henthorn—and to truly troubling effect. I offer that
kind of detailed, one-by-one “other purpose” analysis below.
The prosecution should have provided it in Henthorn—and did
not.
But there is a second matter that merits mention here too:
pertinent precedent. The parties in Henthorn were at no loss
for relevant precedent. Questions of character evidence are
common in our courts,97 and both Harold and the prosecution
found plenty of precedent to cite—from state courts, from
inferior federal courts, and in a way from the United States
Supreme Court too.98
Much of this precedent cuts in the prosecution’s favor.
Some even accepts similar “other purpose” arguments and
admits similarly damning evidence.99 This may be because of
the arresting facts of those cases—the violent defendants, the
malicious schemes, the terrible crimes. Or it may be because
certain flaws in character evidence doctrine have grown
ingrained and entrenched, spawning reliance and replicating

character inferences.”); Government’s Response, supra note 87, at 17 (“Each of
these proper 404(b) inferences—motive, intent, plan—draw from the doctrine of
chances, rather than from character inferences.”). This is, put bluntly, neither
careful nor correct.
97. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the
Character Evidence Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical
Relevance, the Doctrine of Chances, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 419, 433 (2006) (noting
that Rule 404(b) “generates more published opinions than any other provision of
the Rules”). There are surely thousands of Rule 404 issues that do not find their
way into published opinions too.
98. See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); United States v. Joe,
8 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1993); State v. Roth, 881 P.2d 268 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
99. See, e.g., United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1991) (admitting
evidence under the doctrine of chances that the defendant had, years before,
killed his wife for insurance money); State v. Roth, 881 P.2d 268 (Wash. Ct. App.
1994) (admitting other acts as “plan” evidence).
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error across the board. I think it is at least partly the latter,
and I hope that this Essay will shed some light on those
persistent character flaws, encouraging some careful
rethinking of old decisions and forfending similar missteps
from being taken next time. But still almost none of those cases
merit elaboration here—not Joe or Commanche, not Roth or
York.100 But one case does: Lisenba.101
Lisenba holds a privileged place in the prosecution’s
argument. It is a Supreme Court case, for one—a relative
rarity in the character evidence universe. It also stands, the
prosecution says, for an important legal endorsement, a
knowing and undiluted Supreme Court embrace of the so-called
doctrine of chances—a particularly difficult, particularly
unusual, particularly relevant, and particularly contentious
“other purpose” under Rule 404.102 This supposed endorsement
is far from forthright—for even the prosecution concedes that
the Court nowhere “addresse[s the doctrine of chances] by
name.”103 But “if you look at Lisenba,” the prosecution assures,
the embrace and endorsement are there for all to see.104 “[I]f
you look at Lisenba,” they say, all will be clear.
That assurance was enough for the District Court. In fact,
it was enough by itself to convince the District Court to write
this: “As the government pointed out during oral argument, the
Supreme Court has in fact adopted” the doctrine of chances.105
The court then cited Lisenba and nothing more.106
But it should not have. For that is not what Lisenba says,
means, or does. In fact, if “you look at Lisenba,” as the
prosecution so wisely encouraged, something quite different
emerges—not an “adoption” but a brisk buck-passing, not a
focused question about the doctrine of chances but a broad
query about the due process clause, and not an endorsement of
a peculiar line of reasoning but a meaningfully narrower result.
Yet in Henthorn only Harold’s appellate counsel seems to have
100. See United States v. Commanche, 577 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2009); Joe, 8
F.3d at 1488; York, 933 F.2d at 1343; Roth, 881 P.2d at 268.
101. 314 U.S. 219.
102. I address the doctrine of chances at length, on Henthorn’s facts, infra
Section II.B.2.e.
103. Reporter’s Transcript, Hearing on Pending Motions, Day 2 at 39, United
States v. Henthorn, No. 14-cr-00448-RBJ (D. Colo. May 14, 2015).
104. Id.
105. Order, supra note 15, at 8.
106. Id.
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spotted these distinctions.107 Too many others seem not even to
have looked.
Had they looked, they would have encountered a wild,
brutish, Henthorn-like tale. Major Raymond Lisenba—known
also as Robert James108—was a barber, a conniver, and a
murderer. He married often, at least three times, and two of
his wives seemed to die by his hand. One wife, a manicurist
named Mary, died in bizarre circumstances: she was found,
lungs filled with water and head fully submerged, in a local
“fish pond”—her left leg blackened and distended from
apparent rattlesnake bites.109 An early investigation of Mary’s
death came (in the words of the Court) to “nothing.” But then
Lisenba did something eye-catching: he attempted to redeem a
double indemnity insurance policy on his now-dead wife.
The insurer refused to pay. Even more, local authorities
caught wind of Lisenba’s efforts and reopened their
investigation, eventually filing charges—first for incest, then
for murder.110 In the state trial that followed, prosecutors
mustered all manner of damaging evidence: an autopsy
showing Mary’s unusual condition at the time of her passing,
the testimony of a co-conspirator—a man named Hope—who
said he bought and sold rattlesnakes on Lisenba’s behalf, and a
pair of snakes that prosecutors claimed to be the very ones
Lisenba set on Mary.111
But there was more too. Prosecutors also introduced
evidence of one of Lisenba’s past wives, a woman (unnamed in
court records) who died in the bath only weeks after recovering
from a jarring car accident. That accident, witnessed only by
Lisenba and his then-wife, left the woman’s head gashed,
broken, and “badly crushed”—though Lisenba was somehow
uninjured, and a “bloody hammer” was found “in the back of

107. See Defendant-Appellant’s Reply Brief at 7, United States v. Henthorn,
864 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-1490).
108. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 223 (1941) (“The petitioner, who used,
and was commonly known by, the name of Robert S. James . . . .”).
109. Id. at 224.
110. Id. Though as scandalous, in its way, as the subsequent murder count, the
incest charge is largely unexplained in available records. At most a hazy picture of
incestuous conduct with a niece, one Lois Wright, begins to emerge in some of the
State’s appellate papers. See Respondent’s Brief at 23–24, Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219 (1941) (No. 133).
111. Lisenba, 314 U.S. at 224.
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the car.”112 But still Lisenba was not charged for that event,
and when his then-wife drowned, he cashed a double indemnity
policy on her too.113
Like Harold decades later, Lisenba claimed that this “past
wife” evidence was admitted in error. He argued that it was
character evidence wholly inadmissible under California state
law. But California’s trial courts disagreed, admitting the
evidence under their own rules of relevance—and then trying,
convicting, and sentencing Lisenba to death.114 The California
Supreme Court affirmed that conviction repeatedly—first on
direct appeal, then on rehearing, and then again on collateral
(state habeas) review. Yet only in his habeas petition did
Lisenba raise a federal constitutional issue, arguing that his
conviction violated due process.115 So only on appeal from that
suit could Lisenba reach the Supreme Court.116 Once there,
this was the only question presented for review: Did Lisenba’s
conviction in California run afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
The Court’s answer was negative, narrow, and unadorned.
On the only issue pertinent to Henthorn, in fact, this is all
Justice Roberts wrote:
Third. Testimony was admitted concerning the death of
James’ former wife, on the widely recognized principle that
similar but disconnected acts may be shown to establish
intent, design, and system. The Fourteenth Amendment
leaves California free to adopt a rule of relevance which the
court below holds was applied here in accordance with the
State’s law.117

That is the relevant holding of Lisenba. That is all the Court
said. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, California is “free to
adopt” and apply its own rules of relevance. The state can do as
it wishes. Nothing else, nothing more.
Yet in Henthorn prosecutors and courts found something
112. Id. at 225.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 223.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (discussing adequate and
independent state ground doctrine as a jurisdictional rule).
117. Lisenba, 314 U.S. at 227–28 (citing 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 363 (3d. ed.
1940)).
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else, something more. They found a question about federal
rules of evidence and a judicial “adopt[ion],” somehow, of a
doctrine as a matter of federal law. But Lisenba speaks to none
of that. It discusses state evidence rules, not federal, and it
holds only that the Constitution leaves states “free” to
recognize (or to reject) the doctrine of chances as they see fit.
These distinctions are critical, elemental, and not especially
elusive. They are there for all who truly “look at Lisenba” to
see. Yet too many in Henthorn still missed them.
And that mattered. It mattered that the prosecution and
the courts did not really “look at Lisenba,” for it allowed them
to find supporting precedent where none actually existed. And
it mattered too that the prosecution combined and conflated
diverse “other purposes,” for it helped to steer both parties and
courts away from a more careful, clear-eyed character evidence
approach. Those missteps are remiss, regrettable, and entirely
avoidable. Misread precedent and crafty conflation should not,
and need not, have clouded Harold’s trial. He, like anyone else,
deserved the law scrupulously followed and precedent
faithfully applied. He deserved an assiduous, precise, piece-bypiece evaluation of the prosecution’s alleged “other purposes.” I
offer that now.
2. Specific Applications
By my count, the prosecution in Henthorn identified six
“other purposes”: intent, motive, (common) plan, preparation,
lack of accident, and doctrine of chances. Still another “other
purpose,” modus operandi, goes unlisted and undiscussed in
the parties’ papers, though it seems to exert a powerful
influence on both the prosecution’s arguments and the courts’
analysis despite its absence, so I address it below too.
Two quick qualifications: First, the order of my analysis
does not always track that of the parties. Their papers do not
always list intent first, for example, but I do. That may seem
surprising, especially in an Essay so focused on Henthorn as a
template, but my tack reflects a more rigorous approach to
character evidence, and it will prove more useful in the end.
Even more, because I take these “other purposes” seriatim,
assessing them claim-by-claim instead of more haphazardly,
my “other purpose” discussions can be (re)arranged in a
different order if one prefers. The particular ordering I use here

1126

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

aims to put some of the more obvious arguments first (like
intent and motive) and to leave doctrine of chances for last. The
discussion there will make clear why.
Second, though the prosecution lists half a dozen other
purposes, my list includes only five, not six—even with modus
operandi added to the mix. That is neither careless nor
unintentional, nor a shifty reprise of the prosecution’s clumsy
and repeated conflation of “other purpose” arguments. It is
instead a recognition that some of the prosecution’s purposes—
e.g., intent and motive—are effectively coextensive on
Henthorn’s facts. They rely on the same logic, the same
inferences, and the same law—everything, in fact, except the
same name. I therefore assess these sibling “purposes”
together, starting now with intent and motive.
a. Intent & Motive
Intent is a permissible non-character purpose. So too is
motive. Under Rule 404, a person’s crimes, wrongs, or other
acts may be used to show that person’s intent or motive to do a
particular thing in this instance. One act can be used,
sometimes, as evidence of intent or motive in another.
But when? When are other acts permissible evidence of
motive or intent, and when are they not?
Consider an illustration:118 Suppose a defendant—call him
Bruce—is on trial for assault with a deadly weapon. He has
been accused, in this case, of firing a gun at a pair of police
officers who he (allegedly) spotted driving slowly up his street.
Bruce denies owning a gun, let alone ever shooting one, but
prosecutors have evidence to dispute that claim. Even more,
they have evidence that Bruce had a warrant outstanding for
his arrest—a warrant connected to a robbery charge in another
jurisdiction. Bruce admits he knew of this warrant.119
It is no mystery why Bruce would fear this evidence. Word
of the arrest warrant could cast him in a dim and lawless light,
making him seem like a bad person with a propensity to do bad
things: if he is subject to a warrant elsewhere, he is more likely
to have done something unlawful here—or so the logic would
118. I base this illustration, loosely, on United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 314
(8th Cir. 1978).
119. Had he not so admitted, it would have been a question of conditional
relevance under Rule 104(b). FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
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go.120
But here the prosecution could make a credible noncharacter claim. It could argue that evidence of the warrant
shows, not that Bruce is congenitally criminal, but that he had
a specific and particular reason to fire the gun that day. Bruce
knew of the warrant, feared its execution, and shot to avoid
apprehension. That was his reason, his intent and his motive.
Far from being propensity evidence, the warrant is why Bruce
did what he did—the motive he had, the intent he carried. Or
so his prosecutors could claim.
Harold’s prosecutors claim something similar. They say
that Harold’s other acts, the beam and the Jeep, reveal his
intent to kill Toni on September 29—his reason for action, his
motive to do harm.121 Harold meant to do those evil things
before, tossing the beam and collapsing the Jeep, so surely
(they say) he intended to do something vile on the clifftop too.
By their very nature Harold’s other acts confirm his malicious
intent and his shameful motive—and therefore sidestep Rule
404. Or so the prosecution believes.
But that is not right. For Harold is not Bruce. Bruce’s
intent argument can stand independent of any character
inference, fully free of propensity’s taint. Harold’s cannot. His
is a propensity argument cloaked in “other purpose” guise—
logical, persuasive, but impermissible all the same.
I should make this point particular and plain. So start
with Bruce: His warrant is the very reason he fired the shots.
It is not two steps removed from his alleged assault, connected
by some thin, propensity-based notion that he did something
bad elsewhere so he must also have intended to do something
criminal here. The warrant is the reason he fired. It created a
motive to shoot where none need have existed before. One act
gave specific reason for the other. The line between them runs
straight, unmediated, and clear of any propensity inference.
But compare Harold: The beam and the Jeep are not the
reason he pushed Toni.122 He pushed Toni because he wanted
money—the same (preexisting) reason, perhaps, that he tossed

120. And it might go just that way once given to the jury.
121. See Government’s Response, supra note 87, at 16–21.
122. Put slightly differently, Harold did not push Toni because Lynn died.
Unless, perhaps, he suspected Toni of sabotaging the jacks and scattering the lug
nuts more than a decade before . . .
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the beam and collapsed the Jeep.123 That same evil intent
traces through the years and across events, running from Jeep
to beam and then (apparently) to cliff. But that kind of
consistency in motive is not a character solution.124 It is the
crux of a character problem. Neither the beam nor the Jeep
gave Harold a new or particular or distinct reason to shove
Toni, creating intent where none existed before. They simply
illustrated the same alleged intent recurring again and again,
a vile character doing despicable things repeatedly, for the
same reason, over and over. That is not non-character
reasoning. It is an intent argument125 built entirely and
inextricably on a propensity idea: Harold did those other acts
with malicious intent before, so he is more likely to have done
this with malicious intent here.126 Harold’s prosecutors may
call this intent or motive evidence, but it is plain propensity
reasoning—and precisely what Rule 404 bans.127
One final note here: In their papers, the prosecution leans
123. It is worth emphasizing that evidence of Harold’s odd and extensive
insurance purchases was admitted without real question or challenge.
124. The prosecution in Henthorn repeatedly misses this point. In fact, the
prosecution frequently and aggressively advances a rank misunderstanding of
Rule 404 logic and law. An example: “But all 404(b) evidence is based on
repetition. In every case of 404(b) evidence, a fact from the defendant’s past (or his
future) makes a disputed fact from his present case more likely to be true because
of similarities between the acts, i.e., the repetition involved.” Answer Brief, supra
note 20, at 57. To put it mildly, this is wrong. Indeed, even accounting for
adversarial overstatement, this summary is mistaken at its core. I address pieces
of this summary at greater length infra, Section II.B.3.b. But I should say, even
now, that but a cursory review of the relevant doctrine—or quick skim of a decent
Evidence textbook (of which there are many)—could have forfended this
inaccurate “it’s all similarity” claim. There are ample instances in which “Rule
404(b) evidence” is not “based on repetition” or “similarities.” See, e.g., United
States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 314, 314 (8th Cir. 1978). And there are ample
instances, too, in which Rule 404(b) prohibits the introduction of evidence because
a particular similarity—namely, a person’s character—is most salient. The
prosecution’s claim here is thus too narrow and too broad, ignoring Rule 404
arguments that are not based on repetition while overstating those that are.
125. Or, as the prosecution drifts into calling it, a malice argument. See
Government’s Response, supra note 87, at 16–17.
126. It is worth emphasizing that the prosecution effectively, if inadvertently,
concedes this very point. In its response to Henthorn’s Motions in Limine, the
prosecution writes that “Henthorn’s prior attempt on Toni’s life is proof that he
harbored the mens rea for first-degree murder.” Government’s Response, supra
note 87, at 16. About this, the government is probably right: Harold meant to kill
Toni, both here and there. But this point, if right, also gives the prosecution’s
propensity game away. Trying to kill Toni was just what Harold did—his type of
conduct, his brand of crime.
127. And, again, for good reason. See supra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text.

2018]

CHARACTER FLAWS

1129

heavily on Edward Imwinkelried’s thoughtful “treatise on
uncharged misconduct evidence.”128 In particular, to support its
claim that the beam (if not the Jeep129) is pertinent to prove
Harold’s intent to harm Toni, the prosecution quotes Professor
Imwinkelried’s assertion that “uncharged conduct may be
logically relevant to prove malice,” at least when the targeted
victim is the same.130
That seems entirely right. But it is also only half of the
question. “Relevant” does not always mean admissible, and
logic does not always guide the law.131 To be admissible,
evidence must be relevant and also free of impermissible
propensity reasoning. In the language of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, it must satisfy Rules 401, 402, and 403—and also
404. I do not doubt that Harold’s other acts are “logically
relevant” to his intent on September 29. But that is less than
the law requires, even if it is all the prosecution claims. By its
own admission, the prosecution argues that because Harold
intended to kill Toni before he was more likely to have
intended to kill her on September 29. That is a “logical”
argument, no doubt, but it is also a propensity one. It is
therefore barred, without more, by the terms of Rule 404.132
b. Plan & Preparation
But the prosecution does not argue only intent and motive.
Harold’s prosecutors also argue plan and preparation, claiming
that Harold’s other acts prove he planned and prepared to
murder Toni that dark September day. Even if intent and
motive fail, they say, Harold’s acts can come in this other way.
It is an argument with a certain appeal. Harold did seem
to “plan” his attack on Toni, to “prepare” to kill her somehow,
and to labor at it until he succeeded. Even more, his “plan” to
kill Toni looks a bit like his “plan” to murder Lynn so many
years before. The one, as the prosecution writes, may even

128. See Government’s Response, supra note 87, at 16–17.
129. By comparison, the Jeep seems irrelevant to Harold’s intent vis-à-vis
Toni. He would not meet her until years after the Jeep collapsed.
130. Id.
131. See HOLMES, supra note 73.
132. And to the extent that Professor Imwinkelried, the prosecution, or the
courts claim otherwise, see Government’s Response, supra note 87, at 17. Rule
404 makes plain that they are wrong.
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seem like a “repeat[]” of the other.133
But that does not make Harold’s other acts permissible
“plan” or “preparation” evidence under Rule 404. It makes
them propensity evidence—impermissible “other act” examples
of Harold doing the same kind of thing over and over, time and
again.
Consider another illustration: Suppose a defendant—call
her Danette—is on trial for credit card fraud. She has been
accused, in this case, of making frequent and expensive
purchases—a refrigerator, a computer, a car—using other
people’s credit cards. Danette denies making any of these
purchases, let alone all of them, but prosecutors have evidence
to dispute that claim. Even more, they have evidence that
Danette recently shoplifted a pair of credit card “skimmers”—
small machines, legal but favored by scammers, that
imperceptibly capture and cache credit card numbers for later
use. Danette does not deny owning these devices.
As with Bruce, it is no mystery why Danette would worry
about this evidence. Information about the skimmers could cast
her as a ready and willing thief, a devious person with a
propensity to do devious things: if she stole the tools of fraud,
she is more likely to steal and defraud elsewhere too—or so the
logic would go.
But here, as with Bruce, the prosecution could make a
credible non-character claim. It could argue that evidence of
the skimmers shows, not that Danette is criminal by character,
but that she had a coherent, connected, multi-step scheme—a
plan to make the very unauthorized purchases now charged.134
Danette acquired the skimmers, lifted the credit card numbers,
and then bought things unlawfully. That was her “overarching”
operation,135 her conjoined and connected plot. Far from being
propensity evidence, the skimmers are an inextricable part of
the story of the charged offense, an early chapter in the tale of
this charged crime. They are constituent parts of an integrated
plan. Or so her prosecutors could claim.
Harold’s prosecutors claim something similar. They say
that Harold’s other acts, the beam and the Jeep, reveal a

133. Id. at 13.
134. Danette also had the means to do it.
135. See, e.g., Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444, 452–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005);
United States v. Posner, 865 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1989).
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“common plan” and preparation too.136 Those other acts, they
argue, show that Harold had a pattern: he bought “life
insurance on women with whom he had built a trusting
relationship and then kill[ed] them to profit from their
death[s].”137 Evidence of his other acts, the beam and the Jeep,
merely lays this pattern bare, making clear his “repeated” and
shameful endeavors—and therefore avoiding the prohibition of
Rule 404. Or so, again, the prosecution believes.
But that, again, is not right. For Harold is not Danette.
Danette’s plan and preparation argument can work without
any character inference, entirely clean of propensity’s stain.
Harold’s cannot. His is a propensity argument simply shrouded
in “other purpose” labels—overstated, overbroad, and
impermissible just the same.
I should make this point equally careful and clear. So start
with Danette: Her theft of the skimmers was part of an
“overarching” plan. It was one piece of a single plot—an early,
incorporated step toward the perpetuation of credit card
fraud.138 The skimmers were not evidence of Danette doing the
same thing over and over, “planning” the same type of crime
time and again. Nor were they two steps distant from her
purchases, linked by some scant, propensity-based notion that
she did something fraudulent elsewhere so she must have done
something similarly fraudulent here. Danette’s theft of the
skimmers was part of a single entwined venture—a
“constituent part[] of [an] overall scheme.”139 She stole the
skimmers so she could commit the fraud. The link between
skimmer and fraud is sharp, direct, and free of any propensity
inference.

136. Government’s Response, supra note 87, at 12.
137. Id.
138. I should note that this “plan” argument works even though Danette’s acts
are significantly different. Stolen skimmers are not the same as fraudulent credit
card purchases—the only thing linking them being the criminal penchant of the
perpetrator. The prosecution’s claim in Henthorn that “common plans always
result from . . . repeated behavior” is thus over- and under-inclusive: it improperly
excludes “plans” consisting of dissimilar acts (like Danette’s), even though Rule
404 intends to capture them; and it includes “plans” of mere repetition (like
Harold’s), even though Rule 404’s bar on propensity reasoning clearly means to
set them apart. See Government’s Response, supra note 87, at 13. Even more, the
prosecution’s related res gestae argument fares no better, and the district court
was right to reject it. See Order, supra note 15, at 14 (“The deck incident cannot
reasonably be viewed as part of the res gestae of the alleged murder.”).
139. State v. Kirsch, 662 A.2d 937, 943 (N.H. 1995).
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But compare Harold: The beam and the Jeep are not part
of Harold’s clifftop plan. They are not constituent steps toward
September 29, as if Harold threw the beam or broke the jacks
to lure Toni, months or years later, to her death in the park.
They are simply evidence of Harold doing (or trying to do) the
same thing over and over: inflicting harm on a heavily-insured
spouse. That is all those acts could show. Even the
prosecution’s own papers, which build entirely from the
premise of “repeated behavior,” confirm this point.140
It is true, of course, that Harold’s conduct suggests a
pattern. His acts, all three, are somber and deadly
reverberations of some “common” elements: insurance, spouse,
secluded locale. But “plan” evidence demands more than just
features in “common,” and patterns often cause character
complications, not character cures.141 That Harold did the same
thing more than once—buying insurance, harming a spouse—
tells us something: that he is dangerous, that he is brazen, that
he has a penchant for harming his wives. But it does not prove
a “common plan” or preparation in the way the law requires.
The beam and the Jeep were not part of a unified, connected,
“overall scheme.” They were merely evidence of Harold’s
proclivity for committing and recommitting the same kind of
crime—his propensity to do “repeated” bad things. Rule 404
prohibits precisely that.
And for good reason too. If Rule 404 permitted evidence
based only on repetition, the bar on character would dip toward
nothing. Parties could offer all manner of other act evidence—
old bank robberies, recent criminal assaults—whenever they
could spot something vaguely “patterned” or “common” between
events: a weapon used, an amount taken, an intended outcome,
a time of day. It would be all-too-easy, the “plan” (or
preparation) purpose opening wide to the introduction of
blatant propensity evidence: an old bank robbery admitted
because of a “common plan” to threaten tellers or a “pattern” of
taking money, a criminal assault admitted because of a
“common plan” to harm victims or a “pattern” of throwing fists,
a prior offense admitted because of a “common plan” to commit
felonies and a “pattern” of trying not to get caught. That result
would be peculiar, extreme, and entirely incompatible with the

140.
141.

Government’s Response, supra note 87, at 13.
Id.

2018]

CHARACTER FLAWS

1133

text and spirit of Rule 404. It would revive the very “once a
criminal, always a criminal” notion that Rule 404 aims to
reject.142 Yet that is precisely what the prosecution in Henthorn
advocates, building its “plan” argument on a foundation of
nothing more than “repeated behavior” and ending with a
theory that proves far too much. By fact and by law, Harold’s
other acts did not show “plan” or “preparation.” They were
impermissible propensity evidence here too.143

142. More than a dozen years ago, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals put it
plainly:
Unfortunately, courts frequently admit evidence of extraneous acts
under this exception not to show acts the defendant took in preparation
for the ultimate charged offense, but to show repeated acts that are
similar to the charged offense. Repetition of the same act or same crime
does not equal a “plan.” It equals the repeated commission of the same
criminal offense offered obliquely to show bad character and conduct in
conformity with that bad character—”once a thief, always a thief.” This
bad-character-conformity purpose, whether express or not, is precisely
what is barred by Rule 404(b). Thus, if the proponent is unable to
articulate exactly how an extraneous act tends to prove a step toward an
ultimate goal or overarching plan, the evidence is not admissible to prove
part of a “plan.”
Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444, 451–52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citations
omitted). But see People v. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1994) (understanding “plan”
as the same kind of acts repeated over and over again); Miguel Mendez & Edward
Imwinkelried, People v. Ewoldt: The California Supreme Court’s About-Face on
the Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of An Accused’s Uncharged Conduct, 28
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 473, 505 (1995) (advocating for a return to a pre-Ewoldt
approach).
143. On this point, the prosecution also makes the peculiar claim that the
evidence in Henthorn is different, and therefore admissible, because it concerns
Harold’s “deliberative process,” not his “inherent tendencies.” See Government’s
Response, supra note 87, at 14. How Harold thinks, the prosecution contends, is
categorically different than how Harold acts—at least under Rule 404. Id.
But this argument finds no support in logic or in law. By its terms, Rule 404
applies just as powerfully and just as directly to evidence about a person’s “active
deliberative process,” id., as it applies to anything else—so long as the pertinent
logic is built on a foundation of propensity. It is no better to say, under Rule 404,
that a person deliberates in a particular way and therefore is more likely to have
deliberated that way here than it is to say that a person acts in a particular way
and is therefore more likely to have acted in that way here. Both are propensity
claims through and through, so both are prohibited by the letter and the spirit of
Rule 404. See FED. R. EVID. 404. The reducio ad absurdum offered by the
prosecution—“[a] person cannot have a character trait for buying life insurance,”
see Government’s Response, supra note 87, at 14—only proves as much. Rule 404
does not, and should not, turn on empty linguistic distinctions or self-serving
shifts in levels of abstraction.
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c. Absence of Accident (or Lack of Mistake)
But the prosecution in Henthorn argues still more. It
argues that Harold’s other acts also qualify as “absence of
accident” evidence—proof that what happened to Toni was no
slip-up or mistake. In the prosecution’s papers, this “accident”
claim is invariably tangled up with others, a quick phrase or
half-sentence inserted in passages largely about other things:
intent, plan, doctrine of chances.144 But absence of accident145
is a permissible “other purpose” all by itself—a claim with its
own doctrine, its own reasoning, and thus its own treatment
here.
The idea of absence of accident evidence is simple: Some
acts can prove that others were not blunders. One act can show
that the next was not a mistake.
But if the idea of absence of accident is straightforward, its
application can be complex. So consider a third illustration:
Suppose a defendant—call her Sonya—is on trial for maiming
her brother. She has been accused, in this case, of deliberately
dumping a pot of scalding oil on her sibling’s left arm. Sonya
does not deny that her brother is injured, or that she dropped
the pot, but she argues that the burn was an accident—a
clumsy kitchen mishap, not an intentional (and criminal) pour.
Prosecutors have evidence to counter that story: the testimony
of Sonya’s injured brother and a photo of his burn. Even more,
they have evidence that Sonya once spilled blistering oil on a
cousin, an event for which she pled accident and was never
charged.
It is obvious why Sonya would be concerned about this old
spill here. News of her cousin’s misfortune could cast her as a
serial abuser, a nasty person with a propensity to do nasty
things: if she doused one relative with boiling oil before, she is
more likely to have done it to another this time too—or so the
logic would go.
But here the prosecution could make a credible noncharacter claim. It could argue that evidence of the cousin
shows, not that Sonya has a penchant for felonies, but that
144. See, e.g., Government’s Response, supra note 87, at 13, 14, & 17; Answer
Brief, supra note 20, at 49.
145. This “other purpose” is sometimes called “lack of mistake” as well. See,
e.g., United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1439 (10th Cir. 1985) (relying on the
language of an older version of Rule 404).
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there was no accident with her brother that day. Sonya once
burned her cousin, accidentally or not, so she knew the risks of
hot oil. The event with her brother thus could not have been a
bungle or a mishap. She meant it. Far from being propensity
evidence, the cousin’s burn proves Sonya did not blunder with
her brother. It shows an absence of accident, a lack of mistake.
Or so her prosecutors could claim.
But note quickly the looming (analytical) risk: This
accident logic, reasonable as it seems, very nearly replicates
the intent and motive arguments discussed and debunked
above. It veers very close, that is, to saying that the brother’s
burn could not be accidental because the cousin’s earlier burn
proves that Sonya tends to do this sort of thing on purpose.
That is not an irrational supposition. But it is still propensity
reasoning. Call it intent or absence of accident or lack of
mistake, it is still barred by Rule 404.
But Sonya’s prosecutors could offer plausible rejoinder.
They could say that their absence of accident argument does
not depend on propensity or intent. It depends instead on
notice and knowledge: Since Sonya injured someone with hot
oil before, she should be on special notice now of its dangers—a
kind of specialized personal knowledge of its perils and threats.
And since Sonya had that specialized knowledge of the hazards
of hot oil, the event with her brother could not have been an
accident—even if the event with her cousin still was—for
Sonya would have been especially wary of oil’s dangers either
way. She knew better because of what happened before, so she
surely did not slip up here.
This is not the tightest of arguments. It is looser, no doubt,
than many parties might prefer.146 But still it has two
significant benefits: One, it leaves the prior incident exactly
where it started, unchanged and unmodified, for Sonya could
have learned plenty about hot oil even if the cousin incident
was an accident. The “notice” accident theory works, that is,
without recasting the past. And, two, this argument is truly
free of character, for it does not require the inference that
spilling scalding oil is the type of thing Sonya tends to do by
design. The “notice” accident theory works, that is, without
146. It is so loose, in fact, that it might not satisfy the requirements of Rule
403. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (permitting courts to exclude evidence when the
probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by, inter alia, the risk
of unfair prejudice).
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propensity.
Harold’s prosecutors can claim neither advantage. For one,
they cannot hold his old acts constant. Instead they must
recast and recategorize them as intentional, for the beam and
the Jeep would be wholly irrelevant if truly accidents. (What
would an accidental tire-repair tragedy teach Harold about
vigorous hiking seventeen years later? And what would an
accidental wood beam injury teach Harold about clifftop
safety?) Nor can Harold’s prosecutors sidestep propensity.
Instead they must revive and rely on it, for their argument
depends entirely on Harold having a tendency—a character—to
intend to do particular things. Seen clearly, the prosecution’s
absence of accident claim is but a reprise of their unavailing
intent argument: Harold’s past acts were not accidents, so this
was not either; he did those things on purpose, so he is more
likely to have done this on purpose too. As the prosecution uses
them, in fact, the beam and the Jeep could not be awful but
instructive mishaps, tragic lessons learned by a onceblundering defendant. They could offer Harold no instruction
and provide him no “notice.” They could only be evidence of
Harold doing the same thing over and over: deliberate,
committed, and repeated attempts to isolate a victim, to inflict
harm, and to reap reward. That may be a sane argument, a
logical inference, and a reasonable conclusion. But it is also
prohibited propensity reasoning by yet another name.
d. Modus Operandi
One other name—modus operandi—goes mostly missing in
the prosecutors’ papers. It does not appear among their long
list of “other purposes,” hinting (perhaps) that the prosecution
found a modus operandi argument too unconvincing to make.
But a close look at these papers suggests something different—
not a forgone argument, but a powerful shadow influence. It
suggests an almost magnetic modus operandi pull on the
prosecution’s Rule 404 approach even as the words themselves
still go unsaid. I thus address that “other purpose” here.
Modus operandi is a time-tested “other purpose” under
Rule 404. It permits parties to offer a person’s other acts to
establish that person’s distinctive manner of operating—his
fingerprint approach, his signature crime, his modus operandi.
Mere similarity and “prosaic commonality” are not enough
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here.147 To satisfy modus operandi’s high bar,148 evidence must
reveal a method that is peculiar, specific, idiosyncratic—
remarkable enough to “earmark [the relevant acts] as the
handiwork of the same individual.”149 A handful of pedestrian
“things in common” will not do.
Consider an illustration:150 Suppose a defendant—call him
Parker—is on trial for printing and passing counterfeit bills.
He has been accused, in this case, of deliberately using a stack
of fake fifty-dollar notes, made on his sophisticated home-press,
to fund a weeklong excursion to Las Vegas. Parker does not
deny that he visited Las Vegas, or that he spent (and lost) a
good deal of cash while there, but he argues that the bills at
issue were not his—not produced on his machine, not pulled
from his pocket. Prosecutors have evidence to counter Parker’s
denial: statements from casino employees, testimony from
expert witnesses, surveillance video showing Parker passing
phony bills. Even more, they have evidence that Parker was
convicted of printing and passing counterfeit bills once before—
in Atlantic City, at a casino, eight years ago.
It is no surprise why Parker would be anxious about this
evidence. News of his prior counterfeiting conviction could cast
him as a chronic swindler, an underhanded person with a
propensity to do underhanded things: if he printed and passed
counterfeit bills before, he is more likely to have done it
again—or so the logic would go.
But here the prosecution could make a credible noncharacter claim. It could argue that evidence of the Atlantic
City counterfeiting proves, not that Parker has a tendency to
swindle, but that his Las Vegas adventure follows a distinctive
and idiosyncratic style—a particular modus operandi all
Parker’s own. Parker once printed and passed counterfeit bills
in an unusual and distinguishing manner, and that manner
matches what happened in Las Vegas almost perfectly: the
bills bore identical serial numbers and reproduced a unique
printer’s glitch; they came on identical (and rare) cotton-stock
147. United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted).
148. At least when the evidence is offered by a prosecutor. See United States v.
Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing modus operandi evidence offered
by a criminal defendant).
149. Trenkler, 61 F.3d at 53.
150. I base this illustration, loosely, on United States v. Burchfield, 719 F.2d
356 (11th Cir. 1983).
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paper and used identical (and rare) plant-based dyes; they
reiterated an identical (if tiny) joke in the Treasury Secretary’s
signature and repeated an identical misspelling of pluribus as
“plurubus.” Whoever did the one surely did the other, not
because of some noxious propensity to counterfeit, but because
no one else does things quite that way. Las Vegas could only be
Parker’s crime. It bears his mark. Far from being propensity
evidence, Atlantic City fingers Parker by excluding all others—
a kind of identity argument by way of modus operandi. Or so
his prosecutors could claim.
Harold’s prosecutors seem to claim something similar.
They seem to argue that Harold has a signature method, a
unique way of operating that traces from Toni all the way back
to Lynn: he ensnares trusting women, secures exorbitant
insurance coverage on them (typically without their
knowledge), and then kills them to collect. That is his
blueprint, his modus operandi—even if in their papers Harold’s
prosecutors call it something different and less apt. Or so they
seem to believe.
But that (again) is not right. For Harold (again) is not
Parker. Parker’s modus operandi argument works free of any
character inference, close to but still distinct from any claim
about propensity. Harold’s does not. His modus operandi
argument, to the extent it is there at all, simply rehearses the
impermissible plan and intent theories refuted above—
coherent, rational, but still infirm.
I should make this point equally sharp and exact. So recall
Parker. His Atlantic City conviction does more than reveal the
kind of pedestrian, superficial similarities that countless
counterfeiters would share: bill denomination, say, or
mendacious goal. It shows a distinctive and idiosyncratic style,
a manner of counterfeiting that no one else uses. Specifics
matter here: the serial numbers and printer glitches, the paper
and dye, the jokes and misspellings. These are unusual, if not
unique, markers. They are specific indicators of Parker’s
method, not broad or banal similarities found among disparate
crimes. They show how Parker operates—and no one else.
But note, importantly, how this argument must work. It
cannot work by saying that this is simply “Parker’s kind of
crime”—that he counterfeited this way before so he is more
likely to have counterfeited the same way here—for that
argument “would amount to the crassest form of propensity
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reasoning.”151 It can only work by saying that the details show
that no one else could have done this, even if Parker denies
doing it here. The two crimes, Atlantic City and Las Vegas, are
so distinctive and so similar that they must come from the
same hand. It must be Parker because it simply cannot be
anyone else.
Now compare Harold. His other acts do not reveal a
distinctive method or an idiosyncratic approach. They reveal
only the scantest outlines of what so many “black widows” and
“bluebeards”152 do: find a partner, buy insurance, kill for profit,
and hope to get away with it. Harold’s prosecutors do not detail
a peculiar approach or a signature crime, nor do they provide
details that distinguish Harold’s supposed method from that of
any other scheming spouse. They simply list a loose collection
of superficial “things in common”—curious (but different)
events, secluded (but different) locations—and thereby draw
thin, porous lines between two points. That does not meet
modus operandi’s high bar. It merely implies that Harold does
vile but undifferentiating things over and over. The
prosecution’s “things in common”153 argument is thus exactly
like their intent, motive, plan, preparation, and absence of
accident arguments before it: an argument that quickly distills
into little more than the claim that shoving Toni is simply
Harold’s “type of crime.” That may be a reasonable conclusion.
It is probably true. But it is also, like so many of the
prosecution’s other arguments, prohibited propensity reasoning

151. FISHER, supra note 6, at 171.
152. The term “bluebeard” derives from an old French folktale written by
Charles Perrault. See CHARLES PERRAULT, HISTOIRES OU CONTES DU TEMPS PASSE
(1697). Perrault’s villain—ugly, wealthy, and called Bluebeard—kills wife after
wife, only stopping when he is killed himself by a suspicious spouse and her
resourceful siblings. Id. Some say that Perrault’s tale reaches farther back, past
the seventeenth century, to the story of a serial killer in Brittany named Gilles de
Rais. See MARGARET ALICE MURRAY, THE WITCH-CULT IN WESTERN EUROPE: A
STUDY IN ANTHROPOLOGY 267 (1921). Others find different sources. But whatever
Bluebeard’s lineage, he has since become an archetype for murderous husbands—
iconic enough to have been repeated or reprised on stage, page, and screen. See,
e.g., CHARLES DICKENS, CAPTAIN MURDERER (1860); STEPHEN KING, THE SHINING
(1977). The “bluebeard” term was even mentioned in a recent issue of the New
Yorker magazine. See Alec Wilkinson, The Serial-Killer Detector, THE NEW
YORKER (Nov. 27, 2017).
153. This is the problem with the Ewoldt decision too: it purports to be about
the “other purpose” of “plan,” but it is really just modus operandi logic without the
factual or analytical rigor. People v. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d 757, 757 (Cal. 1994).
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in its “crassest form.”154
***

That is a point worth repeating: None of the prosecution’s
initial handful of “other purposes” work. Intent, motive, plan,
preparation, absence of accident, and modus operandi all offer
potential nonpropensity uses, at least on other facts in other
cases. But none work in Henthorn. In Henthorn they are mere
labels, putative “other purposes” attached mistakenly to what
are propensity arguments at their core. The prosecution has
not sidestepped Rule 404 by way of these other purposes. In
different ways, over dozens of pages, it has simply used
Harold’s other acts—the beam and the Jeep—to suggest that
pushing Toni is his type of crime. Killing wives is what Harold
does, time and again, as a matter of his loathsome tendencies
and wicked character.
It is a persuasive point, vividly made. Few juries would
doubt it. But it is also prohibited by the level terms of Rule 404.
And for good reason too. We do not exclude character evidence
because we are blind to its power or oblivious to its allure. We
exclude it because it does both more and less than it should: it
proves too little, tempts too much, and entrenches an
assumption—“once a thief, always a thief”155—deeply
anathema to our notion of justice. Yet this “once and always”
idea is precisely what Harold’s prosecutors offer. Their intent,
motive, plan, preparation, absence of accident, and modus
operandi claims are all built on the forbidden ground of
propensity. It was an error for the courts to accept them.
But not an uncommon one. Henthorn is just one Rule 404
case among thousands in the federal courts. In the state courts
there are thousands more. In some of these cases courts are
careful about character—measured in their approach to
character limits, fastidious in their evaluation of “other

154. FISHER, supra note 6, at 171. It bears mention that modus operandi is a
misfit in Henthorn for another reason too: Harold does not contest identity. Unlike
Parker, who concedes that a crime was committed but disputes that he did it,
Harold claims there was no crime to charge. He doesn’t say Toni was pushed by
some unknown figure; he says no crime occurred at all. Put differently, he doesn’t
say someone else pushed Toni; he says that no one did. That is not a clean fit with
modus operandi, an “other purpose” focused largely on figuring out a perpetrator’s
identity.
155. Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444, 451–52 (Tex. 2005) (citations omitted).

2018]

CHARACTER FLAWS

1141

purpose” claims.156 But in some cases courts are not. They are
casual in their approach to character evidence and cursory in
their assessment of “other purposes” overall. That may be
understandable given how logical, linear, and alluring
propensity inferences can be—and how esoteric “other purpose”
analysis can seem by comparison. But it is still unfortunate.
Parties, even distasteful and despicable parties, deserve better.
They deserve adversaries conscientious about character
evidence and judges unforgiving about character misuse. They
deserve, in Henthorn and elsewhere, a law uninfected by
character flaws.
e. Doctrine of Chances
Yet one “other purpose” remains. That “other purpose”—
the so-called doctrine of chances—is controversial in theory,
uncommon in caselaw, and sometimes sensational in fact.
(Recall Lisenba.) It is also, if treated smartly and separately,
the closest thing to a tenable “other purpose” argument that
Harold’s prosecutors have. I turn to the doctrine of chances
now.
The doctrine of chances builds from a simple intuition:
some things do not happen by chance. Some recurring events,
“if similar enough and rare enough,” cannot be ascribed
entirely to fate.157 When a man somehow loses a dozen vintage
cars in a series of suspicious fires, when a child somehow
appears at school every Monday with the same improbable
bruising, when a woman somehow wins the lottery two or three
times in one lifetime—luck is not to blame. It is not providence
or fortune or “innocent coincidence.”158 It is design.159
The most famous doctrine of chances case, Rex v. Smith,
comes from far away and long ago. It comes from London, in
1915, though the facts may still seem quite apt.160 There three
wives died, one after the other, each by drowning in the
bathtub.161 The wives’ husband, George Joseph Smith, claimed

156. See, e.g., State v. Kirsch, 662 A.2d 937 (N.H. 1995).
157. FISHER, supra note 6, at 200.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Rex v. Smith, 11 Cr. App. R. 229, 84 L.J.K.B. 2153 (1915).
161. Id. Smith’s former wives were named Burnham and Lofty. The death of
his third wife, Mundy, lead to his murder charge. Id.
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all three drownings came by accident and cursed his dreadful
luck—even as he collected on their wills. But the prosecutor,
the jury, and the Justices at Old Bailey did not believe him.162
They thought Smith killed all three intentionally. Fate alone,
they reasoned, could not be so cruel.
The giveaway, to them, was Smith’s repetition. He was
doomed in the eyes of the jury, that is, because the drownings
happened three times. Had but one wife perished in the
bathtub, Old Bailey’s Justice Scrutton said, “the circumstances
might seem . . . to be quite consistent, or very nearly quite
consistent, with accident . . . .”163 But when others died in the
same improbable way—not just one but two—chance could no
longer explain it. It must be something else:
If they found an accident which benefited a person, and they
found that that person had been sufficiently fortunate to
have that accident happen to him a number of times,
benefiting him each time, they [would draw] a very strong
and frequently an irresistible inference that the occurrence
of so many accidents benefiting him was such a coincidence
that it could only have happened by design.164

Evidence of Smith’s past wives—Ms. Burnham and Ms. Lofty—
was thus admitted against him. Smith was convicted after only
eighteen minutes of jury deliberation.165 The doctrine of
chances seemed to have found its solid, if distant, foothold.
But questions remain. One is whether Scrutton’s
“irresistible inference” is truly free of propensity—or whether
the doctrine of chances is simply impermissible character
reasoning by yet another name. A second is whether, assuming
the doctrine of chances is analytically valid, Henthorn’s facts
even fit.
The first question is not new. It has troubled the doctrine
of chances from the very beginning, and its answers now split
into two basic camps—one sketched most famously by
Professor Imwinkelried, the other by Professor Paul Rothstein.
Professor Imwinkelried believes that the doctrine of
162. Id.
163. See FISHER, supra note 6, at 196–97 (reprinting Prisoner Sentenced to
Death. The Closing Scenes, THE TIMES, July 2, 1915, at 4).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 197.
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chances steers clear of propensity reasoning. He admits the
doctrine treads perilously close to it, tempting and even
inviting the jury to make improper propensity inferences all on
its own.166 But he thinks the doctrine still sidesteps character,
for it does not “compel[] jurors to focus” there.167 At most, he
says, it “invites the trier to compare” two things: the accused’s
alleged experience and “statistical data.”168 If the disparity
between those two things is relatively minor—small or
nonexistent—then there is no anomaly to explain and no
inference of wrongdoing need follow. The doctrine of chances
would thus say very little about three gloves lost on a winter
playground or two fender benders in lower Manhattan. But if
the disparity between experience and data is significant—too
large to excuse as mere happenstance, too big to comport with
“everyday, human experience”169—then there is an anomaly to
examine and an inference of guilt to apply. The doctrine would
thus have very much to say about four car-destroying fires, or
one regularly- and similarly-bruised child, or one person
winning the lottery two times over, or three wives drowning in
similar bathtubs. It is not a question of propensity,
Imwinkelried claims, but a matter of probability.170
Professor Rothstein disagrees. He does not question the
value of “data” or the relevance of lived experience. Nor does he
deny the intuitive force of the doctrine of chances overall—the
sense that “it is safe to infer [a] person is not innocent”171 when
the improbable events around that person somehow multiply:
the fires, the bruises, the lotteries, the tubs. He simply thinks
that the anchor of all of this—the doctrine itself, as well as
Imwinkelried’s justification—remains unchanged. It is all still
premised on propensity, improper character reasoning at its
resilient core.
And, he adds, good statistics do not prove otherwise. If
anything, in fact, Imwinkelried’s “data” leave out the most
crucial part: They point to a disparity (between the small
166. Edward Imwinkelried, The Use of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct to
Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence
Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 585–92 (1990).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 588.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Paul Rothstein, Intellectual Coherence in an Evidence Code, 28 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1259, 1262–63 (1995).
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chance that all of the events are “innocent” and the larger
chance that they are not so blameless) but then do nothing to
explain it. They highlight a gap in explanation but then leave it
open. And that gap can only be filled in one way:
[I]t is only because a guilty person would have the
propensity to repeat the crime. If it were not for the
propensity to repeat, . . . the probability that an innocent
person and a guilty person would be charged repeatedly
would be identical.172

On numbers and on logic, Professor Rothstein is right. The
relevant probability would indeed hold steady across all actors
unless there was something to connect the acts: the fires, the
bruises, the lotteries, the tubs.173 The critical question, then, is
what might connect them. The doctrine of chances convincingly
shows what the connection cannot be: it cannot be fate, luck,
chance, or coincidence. Professor Imwinkelried and Justice
Scrutton are correct about that. But Imwinkelried and
Scrutton then elide what the connection must be instead: it
must be propensity. It must be the intentional, repeated
scheming of the defendant—the penchant of that defendant to
commit similar crimes in similar ways over and over: to set
similar fires, to inflict similar bruises, to contrive similar lotto
victories, to drown similar victims. That is the step
Imwinkelried and Scrutton skip over. That is the necessary
doctrine of chances premise they do not make plain—
compelling, convincing, and improper character reasoning all
over again.
And the doctrine’s defenders say as much, even if they do
not see it. In Rex v. Smith, for example, Justice Scrutton
asserts that, once chance is removed, the series of events “could
only have happened by design.”174 In his own work, Professor
Imwinkelried agrees, citing Scrutton’s “design” language in
support of his tighter focus on “relative frequency.”175 And in
Henthorn too, the prosecution follows in lockstep, crafting an

172. Id.
173. The British Royal Statistical Society agrees with Rothstein. See FISHER,
supra note 6, at 200.
174. Id. at 196 (reprinting Prisoner Sentenced to Death).
175. Edward Imwinkelried, The Dispute of the Doctrine of Chances, 7 CRIM.
JUST. 16, 54 (Fall 1992) (citing Scrutton’s “design” passage).
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argument—and an evocative “figure”—that leads to the same
blunt conclusion: “Because it is unlikely the accidents
happened by chance, they are likely the product of design.”176 It
cannot be chance, in short, so it must be “design.” It cannot be
fate or fortune, so it must be who the defendants are and what
the defendants do.
That may be true of Harold Henthorn, of George Joseph
Smith, and of others like them. Slaying spouses may be their
enduring “design.” But that truth only lays the propensity
premise of the doctrine of chances bare: We believe Harold (or
George) did this thing on purpose, just like we believe he did
those other things on purpose, because that is what Harold (or
George) does and “designs” to do. It is his penchant, his
proclivity, his kind of crime. It is his character. Even in the
words of its chief advocates, then, the doctrine of chances relies
on character logic. Its “irresistible inference” is propensity
reasoning in subtle but ineluctable form.177
If this is true—and I am confident that it is—two
consequences follow: One is that the doctrine of chances is not
a legitimate “other purpose” under Rule 404. It is logical in its
outlines but still character at its core, so courts should prohibit
its use altogether—and if lawmakers wish the doctrine to be
available as a true propensity exception, they should revise the
code. The other consequence is that the prosecution in
Henthorn cannot rely on the doctrine of chances either. It fails,
like the many “other purposes” before it, to provide a
permissible basis on which to admit evidence of Harold’s other
acts. It offers no non-character reason to introduce evidence of
the beam and the Jeep.
Yet this last point has a consequence all its own. If the
doctrine of chances is impermissible ab initio, flawed as a
matter of theory and fractured as a matter of doctrine, then the
second question I ask above—whether Henthorn fits—is
irrelevant. It hardly matters whether Harold’s facts line up
with a doctrine that cannot work.
But I should answer that question anyway. The question is
so central to the prosecution’s approach in Henthorn, so vital to
its success in court, that it demands some evaluation even if it
is (or should be) entirely inapt. So, assuming that the doctrine

176.
177.

See, e.g., Government’s Response, supra note 87, at 9.
FISHER, supra note 6, at 196 (reprinting Prisoner Sentenced to Death).
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of chances is analytically valid, does Henthorn fit on its facts?
The answer may well be no.
The concern is not that Harold’s story appears too
plausible. His tale is improbable, even incredible, by its own
terms. It is unlikely that all of these misfortunes—the cliff, the
beam, the Jeep—would befall (or “benefit[]”178) one person
merely by chance.
But the doctrine of chances requires more than an
improbable story. It requires that the relevant misfortunes be
two things more: independently rare and sufficiently similar.179
It is not clear either of those requirements are satisfied in
Henthorn.
First, rare. One requirement of the doctrine of chances is
that the acts in question be individually unusual—infrequent
as winning the lottery, uncommon as drowning in the tub.
Almost everyone in Henthorn seems to assume that Harold’s
acts meet this threshold—that the Jeep and the beam and the
cliff were sufficiently improbable events all on their own. But
that assumption depends on two premises, neither of which is
beyond serious doubt.
One premise concerns data—the numbers, surveys, and
studies necessary to show that the cliff and the beam and the
Jeep are statistically unlikely. I do not have that data. I have
no surveys to show that these events are (or aren’t) statistically
anomalous, no studies to prove that they are (or aren’t)
commonplace—nor have I combed the archives to find them.
But no one in Henthorn—not the prosecution, not the courts—
offered such data either. To repeat: no one in Henthorn
presented data about these events, relying instead on a bland
conjecture about rarity and an unstated assumption about
available support. That would seem an odd and important gap
in argument, a signal omission by the party that bears the
burden of justifying a doctrine of chances claim. But still this
crucial data goes missing, replaced by empty assertion, affected
intuition, and a veiled invitation to employ the very propensity
inference the prosecution claims to avoid.
But that first doubtful premise simply leads to another. It
leads to a question about abstraction—or the appropriate level
of detail at which to assess these events. In claiming rarity,

178.
179.

Id.
FISHER, supra note 6, at 200.
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Harold’s prosecutors pick a level of abstraction convenient to
them, focusing (more or less) on the specific details of Harold’s
alleged acts: not just car trouble, but night-time flat tires on
secluded mountain roads; not just home-renovation injuries,
but two-by-four wooden beams heaved wantonly off darkened
cabin decks. This particular level of specificity does not seem
patently unreasonable. It does not appear definitively wrong.
But it is not clearly right either, and it was apparently chosen
without analysis, discussion, consideration, or caveat. Everyone
in Henthorn, both court and party, simply assumes that it is
the right level, the right choice. Yet that assumption leaves a
crucial part of the prosecution’s case unquestioned, presumed
rather than probed. Worse still, that assumption may prove too
much, for it risks turning the doctrine of chances into an “other
purpose” that swallows the character rule. At the prosecution’s
chosen level of specificity, after all, everything looks rare: every
trip to the supermarket looks anomalous because of the
different items purchased; every jog around the block looks
unique because of the different number of strides. But that can
hardly be the appropriate doctrinal standard, and it can
scarcely obscure what makes Henthorn truly odd: not the
individual occurrences but the combination of events; not the
events independently but the fact that these things keep
happening to Harold—a point that only confirms the doctrine
of chance’s character core.
And there is another doctrine of chances requirement too:
similar. To fit the doctrine, the pertinent acts must be, not just
anomalous, but analogous—as comparable as two lotto
victories, as similar as two deaths in the tub. Unlike rarity
before it, this similarity question receives significant attention
in Henthorn, the Tenth Circuit even labeling it the “lynchpin”
of the case’s analysis—and then deeming the factual overlap
more than adequate.180 But like rarity before it, this similarity
question is not so easily answered. Both “lynchpin” label and
legal conclusion may well be wrong.
For one there is a problem of facts: It is not clear that
Harold’s alleged acts—the beam, the Jeep, the cliff—are
sufficiently similar on their own terms. Flat tires are very
different from secluded clifftops; two-by-fours are quite unlike

180. United States v. Henthorn, 864 F.3d 1241, 1249 (10th Cir. 2017). I
address the incongruity of this label at some length below, infra Section II.B.3.b.
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windy precipices and rocky terrain. Compared to the pertinent
acts in other doctrine of chances cases, in fact—Rex v. Smith’s
tub drownings,181 United States v. Woods’ cyanosis victims,182
United States v. York’s apocryphal lottery wins183—the events
in Henthorn bear little similarity at all.
But there is some. Henthorn’s events are comparable in
two noteworthy ways: Harold’s wives were killed or injured,
and those wives were heavily insured. These are similarities—
undeniable, tragic, and true. In their way they link the three
events together. But those links are still meager, these
similarities still the scantest and most superficial kind. They
capture an overlap that hits only at the surface and a
correspondence that is almost too easy to spot: if this kind of
“similarity” is sufficient, countless events would also prove
sufficiently alike—every bank robbery or Ponzi scheme, every
counterfeit bill or forgery, every plane flight or detour to the
corner store.
They also reveal a crucial shift in the prosecution’s
perspective. They show a turn, strategic if also unstated, to a
very different level of abstraction—a move from close in to far
back. When assessing rarity, the prosecution narrows in and
peers closely, emphasizing nuanced particulars and specific
details: secluded mountain roads, off-trail escarpments,
mysterious purchase patterns, darkened cabin decks.184 Yet
when assessing similarity, the prosecution draws back and
looks impressionistically, highlighting only the most general of
threads: extensive insurance coverage, targeted spouse.185 I do
not claim that one vantage is necessarily better than the
other—that narrow or general or something in between should
always control. I simply note that the prosecution’s approach
here is oblique, inconsistent, and opportunistic—and yet its
choices and changes go unaddressed by both party and court.
One additional point: the doctrine of chance’s “similarity”
requirement has clear echoes in other places. It resembles, in
part, some of the “other purposes” discussed at length above:
181. 11 Cr. App. R. 229, 84 L.J.K.B. 2153 (1915).
182. 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973).
183. 933 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1991).
184. See, e.g., Answer Brief, supra note 20, at 5–8 (“[A] remote spot rarely
visited by park-goers due to its mix of technical and challenging terrain: tree
slopes, cliff faces, and talus fields . . . .”).
185. See, e.g., Government’s Response, supra note 87, at 6 (“The remote areas,
the insurance policies, the effort to avoid witnesses . . . .”).
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plan, preparation, and modus operandi. Those too looked at the
factual overlap among events, the parallels (or not) among
various acts. Those too invoked (at times) the vocabulary of
“similarity.” But that does not make the doctrines identical.
The doctrine of chance’s similarity analysis is distinct from the
analysis of the others, focused on a different “other” use and
built into a doctrine very much its own. On Harold’s facts, of
course, the outcome is consistent: “similarity” does not work in
any “other purpose” context, faltering with modus operandi (for
example) as much as with the doctrine of chances. But that
should not invite haphazard “other purpose” mixing and
matching. The doctrine of chances, like the “other purposes”
before it, should rise or fall on its terms alone.
On those terms, the doctrine of chances misses the mark in
Henthorn. It does not seem to work there, even assuming it can
ever work at all. And I do not think it can. I believe, like others,
that the doctrine is hopelessly flawed in its very conception—
infected by Justice Scrutton’s “irresistible inference” at its core.
The doctrine of chances thus fails in Henthorn on fact, on logic,
and on law.
3. The Courts
But still the courts were persuaded. Both the trial judge
and the appellate panel found the prosecution’s character
claims convincing, allowing the evidence of the beam and the
Jeep to come in. A few brief words about those courts thus
seems in order here.
a. District
I have addressed one thing about the District Court’s
decision in Henthorn already. I have discussed the court’s toocredulous approach to Lisenba, a case that does not say what
the prosecution suggested or what the District Court found.
About that, at least, I need not say more.
But I should make explicit something I have only implied
so far: the District Court did not assess the character question
in Henthorn with the rigor or precision demanded by the Rule.
Instead it engaged Rule 404 in uneven fits and starts, mingling
moments of scrupulous evaluation with passages of meaningful
inaccuracy: a careful review of Tenth Circuit precedent
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followed by an unfounded gloss on Lisenba,186 a fastidious
consideration of res gestae matched with a fumbling review of
“intent,”187 a faithful presentation of Rule 404’s key language
mixed with a conflation of separate “other purposes,”188 an
alertness to the dangers of character evidence paired with a
mingy understanding of propensity.189 This patchy analysis did
harm in Henthorn. It kept the court from assessing the crucial
character question with the appropriate, even requisite care
and concern. It also allowed the parties’ misconceptions about
Rule 404 to creep in and entrench—avoidable errors hardening
into stubborn character flaws—and then presented an
awkward anchor for Harold’s appeal.
b. Circuit
That appeal was inevitable. Harold’s turn to the Tenth
Circuit was fated from the moment the jury found him guilty—
though with one noteworthy change in cast: By the end of his
trial, Harold had run out of money to pay his lawyers. His
private counsel ended their service. A public defender took the
reins.
This new counsel took a surprising tack. It chose to focus,
almost entirely,190 on the doctrine of chances, not by noting
that Professor Imwinkelried’s statistics disguise a propensity
premise, but by claiming those statistics point in two ways at
once: they point away from accident and also away from
deliberate malfeasance.191 In their words:
Say the probability that a given incident was accidental is
5% and the chance it was intentional is 95%. As the
incidents add up, the chance that all of them were accidents
decreases significantly (.05 x .05 x .05 = .00125). But the
chance that all of them were intentional also decreases, to

186. See, Order, supra note 15, at 7–8.
187. Id. at 9, 14.
188. Id. at 9 (“Whether it is called the doctrine of chances or lack of
accident . . . .”).
189. Id.
190. Harold’s new counsel also revisited some familiar character arguments
and reemphasized others, like the admission of Harold’s “other acts” running
afoul of Rule 403. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 25, United States v. Henthorn,
864 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-1490).
191. Id. at 19–20.
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about 86% (.95 x .95 x .95 = .8574). In other words, as the
incidents increase in number, the objective probability that
they shared a common cause actually decreases. . . . Thus,
to infer that each of the incidents was intentional actually
cuts against the objective probabilities that the doctrine of
chances supposedly rests on.192

It is a clever argument, concisely made. It unsettles the
prosecution’s claim that Harold acted intentionally on that
rocky cliff that day. It also has the potential, if accurate,193 to
turn Professor Imwinkelried’s data-based defense of the
doctrine of chances straight on its head—the very same
numbers cutting against the doctrine as for it.
But it was never, in Henthorn, likely to work. The turn to
statistics there looked odd from the outset, more esoteric
distraction than assertive defense. In a case about deceitful
marriages, murky excuses, and violent deaths, the defense’s
figures and formulas were always going to seem abstruse and
peripheral—a hazy sidelight too far removed from the case’s
character core. Where Harold’s counsel could have engaged the
character question directly, it chose instead to proceed
elliptically. Where Harold’s counsel could have talked familiar
evidence law and logic, that is, it chose instead to talk
numbers—and the court was never likely to follow.
Nor was the prosecution. Far from trailing Harold’s detour
into statistics, in fact, the prosecution was happy on appeal to
stick to old character ground: it rehearsed familiar arguments,
like Harold killed for money; it reiterated familiar
misstatements, like “all 404(b) evidence is based on
repetition . . . [and] similarities between acts”;194 and it rebuilt
familiar conflations, like “these proper 404(b) inferences—plan,
motive, intent—draw[] on the doctrine of chances.”195 It did not,
until very late in its brief, rise to take Harold’s statistical
bait—and it rose then only to deem the numbers irrelevant,
192. Id. (citation omitted).
193. I make no claim about the accuracy of Harold’s claim here. Intriguing as
the argument may be, it requires one to hold constant all manner of things—like
the probability of the pertinent events and the independence thereof—that may
resist such holding. I take no position on any of that here.
194. Answer Brief, supra note 20, at 57. I should reiterate that this portion of
the prosecution’s argument is particularly, and problematically, misguided. See
supra note 124.
195. Answer Brief, supra note 20, at 57.
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“faulty,” and flawed.196
Yet the prosecution, in its protracted appellate papers,197
did more than that too. It also made an appeal to human
instinct, a play to emotion and revulsion by way of graphic
image: it inserted, into its merits brief, full-color photographs
of the Granby cabin, the Sedalia Jeep, and (most stunningly)
Lynn’s swollen and bloodied face.198 The ploy was
unmistakable, unabashed—the photos spread across the full
first half of the prosecution’s brief. But it was awkward and
ironic too—awkward because the precise look of the cabin is
irrelevant to anything of consequence on appeal, ironic because
the gruesome image of Lynn can only do precisely what the
prosecution claims to be avoiding so skillfully. It can only cast
Harold as a man of dangerous and murderous character, a
despicable person with a penchant to do harm.199
But the Tenth Circuit panel was still persuaded. It
affirmed the district court in all parts. The appellate court did
not quite mimic all that the district court did or echo all that
the district court said. Nor did it get every issue wrong.200 But
still the Tenth Circuit stumbled in Henthorn. It embedded,
rather than uprooted, the case’s deepest errors. And it
entrenched the very worst of Henthorn’s character flaws.
The court’s missteps begin at the very beginning. For the
Tenth Circuit, even in its introductory framing, misstates the
law. As the panel presents it, Rule 404 admits “all evidence of
other crimes or acts except that which tends to prove only
criminal disposition.”201 In the court’s eyes, that is, Rule 404 is
but a “criminal” character rule.
But that is not so. Rule 404 says nothing about barring

196. Id.
197. Id. The prosecution’s Answer Brief alone runs more than 70 pages.
198. Id. at 19, 25, 34.
199. To ask the question bluntly: Why else include it? No matter how dreadful
it was, the condition of Lynn’s face is entirely irrelevant to anything of substance
in Henthorn. No claim of probity, pertinence, or similarity justifies the
photograph’s inclusion. The only reason to present the image, haunting and grave,
is to stoke the viewer’s visceral fire—and, in so doing, to paint Harold as
dangerous as a matter of character. That may be effective strategy; it may even
have worked in Henthorn itself. But it is precisely what the prosecution claims not
to be doing in the rest of its brief, and it is precisely what Rule 404 prohibits.
200. The court is crisp and deliberate, for example, in its evaluation of
conditional relevance. United States v. Henthorn, 864 F.3d 1241, 1254–55 (10th
Cir. 2017); FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
201. Henthorn, 864 F.3d at 1248 (citation omitted).
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evidence “only [of] criminal disposition.”202 By its bare terms, in
fact, the rule prohibits the introduction of all “[e]vidence of a
person’s character”203—traits and acts that bespeak a person’s
criminal inclinations and her peaceful penchants, her
malicious propensities and her benevolent proclivities. By its
bare terms, that is, the rule addresses far more than character
evidence “only” in criminal cases and far more than evidence
“only” of a lawless “disposition.”204 Yet the Tenth Circuit elides
this plain text. It distorts the scope of this key prohibition and
thus bungles its doctrinal foundation—a small framing error
that exposes big flaws.
And there’s more. The Tenth Circuit also mishandles Rule
404’s “other purposes”—overemphasizing some things,
underemphasizing others, and generally skimming only the
surface of these “other purposes” themselves. Three telling
examples:
One, the court overemphasizes “similarity.” It deems
“similarity,” not just an occasionally pertinent Rule 404 factor,
but the very “lynchpin of Huddleston relevance.”205 Even more,
it implies, by use of that daunting “lynchpin” label, that the
Court has declared “similarity” the most critical of all “other
act” inquiries.
But that (also) is not so. For one, there is a problem of
authority. The “lynchpin” label is not a Supreme Court creation
or a crisp hierarchical command. It is not compelled by
doctrine. In fact, it finds no foothold in Huddleston itself, a case
that addressed similarity, not as a “lynchpin,” but as a targeted
inquiry germane to the case’s facts.206
202. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 404.
203. FED. R. EVID. 404. As noted supra Section II.A, Rule 404’s ban has
exceptions, some listed in Rule 404 itself, others in Rules 413, 414, and 415. Id.;
FED. R. EVID. 413–15.
204. FED. R. EVID. 413–15. The logic underlying the character ban—the fear of
evidence overweighed or of a party punished for conduct not at issue—may point
most powerfully to concerns about evidence of criminal disposition. But the text of
the Rule clearly does not stop there. Id.
205. Henthorn, 864 F.3d at 1249.
206. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988). “Similarity” was
pertinent in Huddleston because of the particular “other purpose” theory proposed
there: the prosecution claimed that Huddleston’s “other acts”—two separate sales
of likely-stolen products—put him on notice that the charged sale was also of
stolen goods. Those other acts proved, the prosecutors claimed, that Huddleston
must have known he was peddling stolen merchandise in this instance too. Id. On
that theory, “similarity” clearly matters: the more similar the other acts, the more
notice they might have actually provided. But that does not mean that similarity
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There is also a problem of concept. For the idea of
“similarity” is neither as expansive nor as useful as the Tenth
Circuit here suggests. In some character contexts, in fact,
“similarity” makes no difference. In some “other purpose”
settings, that is, there is no call for “similarity” between acts at
all. Consider “intent” and “plan”:207 One act can motivate
another even if the two are significantly different—an arrest
warrant for robbery, say, motivating a subsequent gunfight.208
One act can form part of a plan, in turn, even if it bears little
“similarity” to what comes next—pilfered computer hardware,
say, facilitating a scheme to commit credit card fraud.209 In
cases like that, and in plenty of others, the pertinent acts are
diverse, varied, far from factually similar—and yet Rule 404
loses no “lynchpin” at all.
It is true, no doubt, that “similarity” sometimes matters. It
matters, in particular, for modus operandi.210 But Harold’s
prosecutors never argued that specific “other purpose,” nor
should they have succeeded even if they did.211 The supposed
“similarities” in Henthorn are but “prosaic commonalities”212—
vague, undifferentiating overlaps213 that fall far short of
establishing a fingerprint method or a “signature crime.”214
The supposed “similarities” in Henthorn are thus too much and
too little at once: more than enough “similarity” where none is
needed, far too little where the law demands a great deal. The
Tenth Circuit’s survey of “similarity” in Henthorn is thus worse
than misguided. It is analytically overstated, factually
unconvincing, and doctrinally miscast.
Two, the Tenth Circuit underemphasizes the doctrine of
chances and the limits of Lisenba. It assigns the doctrine of
chances a lesser, even secondary status—a supporting
always matters in Rule 404 questions—and the Huddleston Court never says it
does. Id. It also never uses the word “lynchpin.” Id.
207. See supra Sections II.B.2.a & II.B.2.b.
208. See supra Sections II.B.2.a & II.B.2.b
209. See supra Sections II.B.2.a & II.B.2.b.
210. See supra Section II.B.2.d.
211. See supra Section II.B.2.d.
212. United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir. 1995).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Henthorn, 864 F.3d 1241, 1251 (10th Cir. 2017)
(“remote location . . . delayed emergency responders”). Those are hardly specific or
distinguishing features. One might even imagine that, in a place like Rocky
Mountain National Park, emergency responders are always delayed.
214. United States v. LeCompte, 99 F.3d 274, 278 (8th Cir. 1996) (quotation
marks omitted).
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character role at best. And it misreads Lisenba too, glossing
clear over the limits of that sensational case.
The Tenth Circuit says very little about the doctrine of
chances in Henthorn. It does rely heavily on that doctrine’s
dubious logic, grafting it awkwardly onto “other purposes” like
“intent.”215 But the court almost never incants the doctrine’s
own name.216 Only in a footnote, more than halfway through its
decision, does the doctrine get its own airing. Only in a footnote
does the court place the doctrine of chances at center stage.217
And there, in that footnote, the court misleads on
substance and confuses on structure. On substance, the court’s
footnote is doctrinally inaccurate: it underplays the doctrine’s
complexity and controversy; it presumes (without support or
elaboration) that the non-character logic of one “other purpose”
(like “intent”) can transfer seamlessly to any other; and it
neglects (again) to “look at Lisenba”218 carefully, misreporting
twice that the Supreme Court “invoke[d]” the doctrine of
chances there.219 Even more, on structure, the Tenth Circuit’s
footnote misperceives the case: it implies that the doctrine of
chances is peripheral, even unnecessary in Henthorn—that
Rule 404’s other “other purposes” work so well that the
doctrine of chances merits no real mention in the body of the
opinion at all. But that too is critically mistaken. For had the
Tenth Circuit assessed those “other purposes” more
methodically, it would have confronted a tricky Henthorn truth:
Henthorn is a doctrine of chances case or nothing at all. If the
doctrine of chances does not work there, on its own terms,
nothing does.220 Yet the Tenth Circuit, spellbound (perhaps) by
Harold’s sensational story, did not assess those “other
purposes” methodically. It searched instead for factual
“similarity” and, on the rest, simply skimmed.
215. Henthorn, 864 F.3d at 1252 (“Indeed, the prior incidents make it more
likely that the charged offense was the product of design . . . .”).
216. Id. Like Professor Imwinkelried, the Tenth Circuit turns to the language
and the logic of probabilities in Henthorn, writing that “the use of prior
incidents . . . rests on a logic of improbability.” Id. Unlike Professor Imwinkelried,
however, the Tenth Circuit does not understand this as an argument limited to
the doctrine of chances, rooting it instead (inaptly) in “intent, motive, and plan.”
Id.
217. Id. at 1252 n.8.
218. Reporter’s Transcript, Hearing on Pending Motions, Day 2 at 39, United
States v. Henthorn, No. 14-cr-00448-RBJ (D. Colo. May 12, 2015).
219. Henthorn, 864 F.3d at 1252 n.8.
220. See supra Section II.B.2.a–d.
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So, three, the court assumes too much and says too little. It
glosses where it should examine closely, skims the surface
where it should dig in.
A close review of its “proper purpose” analysis, in fact,
finds almost no real digging at all. That analysis reads, nearly
in full:
The government was required to prove Henthorn committed
a specific intent crime: first-degree murder requires a
“willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing.” It
offered the prior acts evidence to prove “Henthorn’s intent,
motive, and plan,” and to “establish that the death of Toni
was no accident.” The district court admitted the evidence to
“rebut[] the defense of accident or to show[] plan and
intent.” These purposes are specifically contemplated by
Rule 404(b) and are plainly proper. Henthorn does not
argue otherwise.221

There is no mistaking the court’s conclusion: there is no
character evidence problem in Henthorn. According to the
Tenth Circuit, Harold’s other acts—the beam and the Jeep—
were properly admitted to prove “intent, motive, and plan.”222
But this (again) is mistaken on the merits. By prevailing law
and logic, it is demonstrably wrong, as the pages above have
shown.223
Yet here, in this short paragraph, there are two problems
more. One is about the party’s positions: Harold does indeed
“argue otherwise.” His defense, both before trial and after
verdict, hinges almost entirely on the notion that Rule 404 bars
evidence of the beam and the Jeep. That Rule 404’s “other
purposes” are not “plainly proper” on these facts is the core of
Harold’s case. It is central, not incidental, to his strategy—the
very heart of his defense. His papers indeed “argue
otherwise”—early, often, and energetically.224
The other is about engagement: the court’s “proper
purpose” analysis barely even broaches the question. It says
little about what intent or motive or plan or preparation or
221. Henthorn, 864 F.3d at 1248–49 (citations omitted).
222. Id. at 1252.
223. See supra Part II.
224. See, e.g., Government’s Response, supra note 87; Appellant’s Opening
Brief, supra note 190.
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absence of accident or lack of mistake or doctrine of chances or
modus operandi actually are—and even less about where they
work, how they sidestep propensity (if and when they do), and
why they supposedly apply “proper[ly]” here.225 All told, in fact,
the court’s “proper purpose” analysis says almost nothing at
all: it provides no definitions, assesses no risks, and makes no
distinctions; it offers no measured deliberations on the question
of character and gives no thoroughgoing evaluations of even
the parties’ own claims. It simply submits a paragraph, less
than fifty words, that states a conclusion and no more—an ipse
dixit in place of detailed analysis, a bare assertion in lieu of
careful review.226
Of course there is more to the opinion. There are more
pages, more citations, and (many) more claims about
“similarity.” But this additional material is unavailing,
orthogonal, and paradoxical at its core: unavailing because the
court’s extensive “similarity” discussion is inaccurate and
beside the point; orthogonal because the court’s evaluations of
conditional relevance and Rule 403 are two steps removed from
the case’s character heart; paradoxical because the court’s
expansive study of Harold’s past—including its remarkably
detailed retelling of Lynn’s death—reveals the problems of, not
the solutions for, character evidence. The Tenth Circuit does
not assure that Harold was convicted properly, in line with
required procedure and free from the taint of character
evidence. It confirms instead that Harold is a dangerous and
despicable man, one who has done bad things before and is
therefore more likely to have pushed Toni in the park that day.
And that may be true. Harold may be an appalling person
and a murderous man. But that is not the point. By logic it is
compelling. By law it is an invalid basis for admission of
evidence, for conviction, or for failure on appeal.
c. Next?
With this, at least, Harold’s counsel agreed. They too found
fault with the Tenth Circuit’s decision—its doctrine and its
distinctions, its conclusions and its law. And so, not long after
the Tenth Circuit’s decision, Harold filed a petition for writ of

225.
226.

Henthorn, 864 F.3d at 1249.
Id.
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certiorari at the Supreme Court—a last-gasp request for more
judicial review.227
His petition was denied.228 With no reference to the merits
and no allusion to the facts, the Court tersely rejected Harold’s
appeal, stating only that it would not hear his case—and that
Justice Gorsuch, once of the Tenth Circuit, played no part in
considering the question.229
That is hardly a surprise. Troubling as Henthorn is, and
common as Henthorn’s character flaws may be, it was always
an unlikely candidate for Supreme Court intervention—more
scandalous than legally significant, more sensational in fact
than salient in law. Even more, the prevalence of Henthorntype errors may have hurt, not helped, the case’s chances for
further review. Supreme Court Rule 10 focuses on “conflict”
between courts, after all, not on common missteps made by
many courts.230
But perhaps the Court will take up these character
questions another day. Perhaps the Court will note the
prevalence of Rule 404 issues in the lower courts, the frequency
of propensity questions, and the ubiquity of Henthorn-like
character flaws—and take a case like Henthorn accordingly. If
it does, it will have a valuable opportunity, a chance to be
deliberate where lower courts have been hasty, clear-eyed
where lower courts—like those in Henthorn—have been
distracted and run askew. It will have occasion, in short, to
outline Rule 404 with the precision and care the doctrine
merits. But perhaps even that remains unlikely.
III. FROM COURTROOM TO CLASSROOM
But Henthorn can still be useful even as the Court steers
clear. It can provide, and has already provided, a service going
forward—not in the courtroom, but in the classroom. This Part
briefly studies how.
For the last three years, I have co-taught a class231 almost
227. Henthorn v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 348 (2018).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (noting that “a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when
the asserted error consists of . . . the misapplication of a properly stated rule of
law”). To be sure, Henthorn did misstate the rule of law. See supra Section
II.B.3.b.
231. With Professor Amy Griffin. We call the class Applied Evidence.
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entirely about Henthorn. As happens in many classes, the
teacher here may have learned more than the students—about
Henthorn, about course and case management, about character
flaws. But the students (I hope) learned a good deal too, not
just about character evidence, but about how errors grow
entrenched in law and doctrine, and how scarce, uneven, and
narrow the paths can be to constructive change.
A.

Genesis

The origins of this course were as fortuitous as they were
formulated. We did not set out to build a class around
Henthorn. We set out to build a writing-focused supplement to
a standard Evidence course, a co-enrollment addition for
students in search of extra writing opportunities.
Then Henthorn found us. Two former students, Ann
Stanton and Erin Butler, knew I was assembling a case file for
a nascent “evidence writing” course. They had read about
Henthorn in local papers and, having already taken Evidence,
spotted its central questions and awkward answers. They
generously flagged Henthorn for me, even providing links to
some of the case’s key documents. I read all they sent me and
more.
The choice was clear. Henthorn was almost too perfect: a
pending case, being litigated in federal court, about a tragic
event that happened just a few years before and just a short
drive away. Even better, it was a pending case with pressing
evidentiary issues and a live, manageable, easy-to-access file.
We pulled the papers, (re)read the accounts, and even listened
to Harold’s haunting 911 calls. The class’s focus and file were
set.
B.

The Lessons

But not everything has been so pedagogically easy. Some
things about Henthorn bedevil the students, and the Tenth
Circuit’s recent decision will do nothing to help that.
The trouble is never the facts. Henthorn’s tale always
rivets the students—the same story that enthralled the courts
gripping them too. But these students, perhaps more than the
courts, are often bothered by the law. They are concerned by
the dense and (perhaps) unworkable structure of Rule 404, the
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clunky framework that fumbles the law’s intuitive ban on
propensity evidence.232 And they are alarmed by the blunt
truth that the Henthorn courts and prosecutors, once and
again, got it wrong.
This is not because the students are naïve. Like all law
students, they have seen and studied judicial missteps before.
But it is one thing for a single case in a class of many to go
astray, and quite another for an entire course to be built on a
proceeding, pending just miles away, that seems to veer, and
then stay, so blatantly off course. That makes the legal
mistakes appear relentless, inescapable, even distressing. And
it risks instilling a kind of enduring uneasiness in all of us, a
special type of frustration since the blunders are so close, so
insistent, and yet so hard to remedy. One difficult lesson of the
course, then, has been just that: that we can learn from errors
but not always do much to fix them, and that those who dig the
deepest cannot always make or modify the rules.233
But there are more. Another lesson is more hopeful: we can
spot and study the errors in Henthorn, but we need not repeat
them. If we work diligently enough, we can get character
evidence right, unlocking Rule 404’s critical protections and
sidestepping these familiar character flaws. That sidestepping
is the substantive meat of our course—the topic of the most
discussion and the subject of our most intensive writing
assignments. It is also the most maddening part of Henthorn.
For the flaws there (and elsewhere) are not inevitable. We can
avoid them, as teachers and as students—and clear-eyed courts
and prosecutors can avoid them too.
The challenge for them, as for us, is not in the law or the
inference. Those all can understand. The challenge is in the
habits of our thinking and the clarity of our approach. The law
of character evidence is easy to articulate and, at times, easy to
apply—at least when the facts line up. But when the facts run
crooked—when they muddy clear character waters, when they
don’t readily help convict a guilty man—things grow harder:
the law counters our most basic instincts, the rules complicate
seemingly simple results.
This is what happened in Henthorn. The facts were

232. See especially Josiah Beamish, A Tale of Two Wives: 404(b) Evidence
Simplified, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (2018).
233. In this sense, the class was like a vox clamantis in deserto.
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complicated, compelling but crooked; the law, faithfully
applied, seemed to help a murderer. So here our habits of
thinking can falter. Our clarity of character approach can give
way—a cloudy understanding of “intent and motive” coming to
overwhelm our ban on propensity evidence, a clumsy take on
“similarity” becoming too much and too little at once. In
Henthorn, this happened, over and over, to prosecutors and to
courts.
And it can happen to students as well. They too find
Harold awful and repugnant, and they too sometimes find our
healthier habits of character analysis giving way to an urge to
convict. But our class here serves a purpose: It reminds of the
need for rigor and precision in analysis at all times—the need
for careful definition, scrupulous application, and proper
analogy no matter what the underlying facts. None of us
wishes to see a guilty man acquitted. But all of us prefer to see
the rules of evidence applied faithfully, soundly, and
evenhandedly—whatever result that may bring. And so here
there is a lesson too: There is no obvious solution for
confounding cases like Henthorn,234 but there is at least one
shared truth: Harold Henthorn—dangerous and despicable
Harold Henthorn—deserves the same rules of evidence the rest
of us do.
That may be easier to say than to do. It is difficult to teach
by way of a case where the result seems cosmically right but
the reasoning legally wrong—both erroneous and not
harmless.235 It is surely difficult to prosecute and adjudicate
that kind of case too. But that is also a lesson, a question, and
ultimately a test: Can we maintain our commitment to Rule
404, not just when it seems ethically simple, but when it seems
morally fraught? Can we uphold the requirements of character
evidence where we worry about what those requirements
demand? Or will we bend, even buckle, and fumble our way
through hard cases by way of character flaw? Our students, the
lawyers and leaders of tomorrow, will have to answer those
questions now.
One last lesson: the story does not end here. It does not
end for us, and it may not end for Harold. For us, there
remains the enduring challenge of character evidence and the

234.
235.

But see Beamish, supra note 232.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2012).
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persistent hope that we—as students and teachers, as
practitioners and judges—will get it right. Character flaws may
be persistent and pervasive, but they are not inevitable.
Henthorn can help us root out and remedy them, if not in that
case then at least in the next.
For Harold, of course, there is no more hope of Supreme
Court intervention—no sliver of a possibility that the Court
will grant certiorari, review his case, and vacate his conviction.
But even if Harold’s conviction had been vacated, he would
not have been in the clear. For one, he could have been retried
for murdering Toni—and the prosecution could well have
earned a conviction without relying on impermissible character
evidence. For another, he could still be tried for murdering
Lynn, since charges for the Jeep incident may finally—so many
years later—be brought.236 These belated charges would not
seem surprising, rash, or coincidental. After reading the story
of Harold and Toni, in fact, they might only seem too late. But
note why. These charges would be unsurprising because Toni
and Lynn—their fates and misfortunes, their difficulties and
deaths—seem connected. And they are. But they are connected
only by way of something the law demands we ignore in
evidence. They are connected only by way of Harold Henthorn
and his loathsome character flaws.
CONCLUSION
It may seem odd to say so much about a single case. And it
may seem strange to write a law review Essay that looks so
much, at first glance, like an appellate brief.
But there is a special, unruly allure to Henthorn and a
broader, more ambitious agenda to this particular Essay.
Unlike so many cases, Henthorn plays out like a gritty parable,
a story reminiscent of a pulp folktale. It sets good against evil,
truth against deception, life against death. And its characters,
236. According to reports, Douglas County law enforcement officials believe
they have the evidence necessary to build a case against Harold for Lynn’s
murder. But they also plan to defer filing charges until Henthorn runs its full
course. See Brian Maass, Investigation Into Death of Henthorn’s First Wife Placed
on Hold, CBS DENVER (Nov. 23, 2015), http://denver.cbslocal.com/2015/11/23/
harold-henthorn-douglas-county-murder-investigation-stopped/ [https://perma.cc/
DR58-5SD7] (“[Sheriff] Spurlock said ‘We believe we have a case we could file. We
believe there is enough evidence.’ But he said it makes more sense to sideline the
Douglas County case so the federal case can continue unfettered . . . .”).
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as we see them, seem almost like caricatures: the cunning and
duplicitous schemer, the trusting and guileless victims, the
skeptical and bereaved families. And so perhaps, as with other
parables, we can learn more from Henthorn than expected—
more about our instinctive reactions, more about the law in
application, more about evidence of character.
That is the hope of this Essay. It aims to review Henthorn
on its own terms, retelling the tale of a noble prosecution gone
significantly awry. But it aims to do more than that too. It aims
to search out the theory behind the practice, to sketch a clean
path through some persistent evidentiary perils, and to find
the lessons for the many in the story of this one. If we can
understand Henthorn—both as case and as parable—we can
understand far more than Henthorn too.
It is important that we do. For questions of character
evidence are more than just common in modern courts. They
are critical, even decisive—a point on which cases rise and fall,
a pivot around which verdicts turn. That is reason enough to do
all we can to get things right in every case. And it is reason to
worry that, without our best efforts, character flaws will, like
character itself, long endure.

